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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CRISIS: 
A QUALITATIVE EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE COMPLIANCE DEBATE 
Michael P. Scharf∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner published The Limits of 
International Law, a potentially revolutionary book that employs 
rational choice theory to argue that international law is really just 
“politics” and does not render a “compliance pull” on State decision-
makers. Critics have pointed out that Goldsmith and Posner’s 
identification of the role of international law in each of their case 
studies is largely conjectural, and that what is needed is qualitative 
empirical data that identifies the international law-based arguments 
that were actually made and the policy-makers’ responses to such 
arguments.  In an effort to fill this gap, with the support of a Carnegie 
Corporation grant, the author convened a series of meetings and 
exchanges with the ten living former State Department Legal Advisers 
to discuss the influence of international law in the formulation of 
foreign policy during times of crisis. This Article reviews the scholarly 
debate about the nature of international legal obligation, presents the 
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results of the Legal Advisers’ meetings, and provides an in depth 
examination of a modern case study involving the treatment of detainees 
in the war on terror which highlights the importance of these findings. 
 
International law is not law; it is a series of political and moral 
arrangements that stand or fall on their own merits, and anything else 
is simply theology and superstition masquerading as law. 
—Ambassador John Bolton1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this Article is to ascertain the influence of 
international law in the formation of American foreign policy in times 
of crisis, using qualitative empirical data provided by a first-ever day-
long meeting the author convened of all of the living former State 
Department Legal Advisers.  While the author was working on this 
project, Professor Jack Goldsmith of Harvard Law School and Professor 
Eric Posner of University of Chicago Law School published The Limits 
of International Law,2 a potentially revolutionary work3 that employs 
rational choice theory to argue that international law is really just 
“politics” and that it is no more unlawful to contravene a treaty or a rule 
of customary international law than it would be to disregard a non-
binding letter of intent.4  In an age in which a growing number of 
academicians and even high level government officials deny there is 
truly such a thing as binding international law, an understanding of the 
role that the State Department Legal Advisor (L)5 and international law 
 
 1 John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs, 10 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000) (Bolton served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during the George W. Bush Administration). 
 2 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
 3 George Washington University Law Professor Edward Swaine writes that U.S. elites may 
seize on Goldsmith and Posner’s book to justify noncompliance with international law and may 
have done so already.  Edward Swaine, Restoring and (Risking) Interest in International Law, 
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 259 (2006).  University of Maryland Law Professor David Gray has opined 
that Goldsmith and Posner’s views “are sure to become standard currency in international law 
theory and practice.”  David Gray, Rule-Skepticism, “Strategery,” and the Limits of International 
Law, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 563, 583 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2). 
 4 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 90; see also Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a 
Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1901 (2003). 
 5 “L” is the name by which the State Department Legal Adviser is known throughout the 
U.S. government.  It is also the name of his office, which includes over 170 Attorney-Advisers 
stationed in Washington, D.C. and abroad.  While L may be little known outside government 
circles, the importance of the office is considerable: virtually no major foreign policy decision can 
be made without first receiving L’s “clearance,” and no delegation can be sent to an international 
negotiation or international organization without a representative of L.  Just as the Department of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) serves as the government’s authority on constitutional and 
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have played in shaping contemporary American foreign policy is more 
important now than ever before. 
In their quest to analyze the impact of international law in 
America’s response to major world events, scholars such as Goldsmith 
and Posner predictably pore over historic documents chronicling the 
details of a given crisis.  Yet, viewing a crisis from the outside of an 
opaque box in this way presents a woefully incomplete and often 
misleading picture.  For what John Chipman Gray wrote in 1927 
remains true today: “On no subject of human interest, except theology, 
has there been so much loose writing and nebulous speculation as on 
International Law.”6  To fill this void, many commentators have opined 
that what is needed is qualitative empirical data that traces the 
contribution of the key individuals and the arguments they made from 
the genesis of the international dispute to its resolution.7   A logical 
place to start such an examination is with the U.S. government official 
most responsible for advocating, interpreting, and applying international 
law: the State Department Legal Adviser. 
Thus, with the support of a Carnegie Corporation grant, in 2004, 
the author, working with Dr. Paul Williams of American University, 
convened a historic day-long meeting of all the living former State 
Department Legal Advisers at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace in Washington, D.C.  Fortunately, the group has 
enjoyed exceptionally good health and longevity, and the author was 
able to assemble eight former Legal Advisers covering thirty years of 
experience: Herb Hansel (Carter Administration), Roberts Owen (Carter 
Administration), Davis Robinson (Reagan Administration), Abe Sofaer 
(Reagan and Bush Administrations), Edwin Williamson (Bush 
Administration), Michael Matheson (Bush and Clinton 
Administrations), Conrad Harper (Clinton Administration), and David 
Andrews (Clinton Administration).  Subsequently, William H. Taft, IV 
and John Bellinger, the Legal Advisers in the George W. Bush 
Administration, provided extensive answers to the author’s questions 
via an exchange of emails, which brought the project up to date. 
In his seminal treatise, Professor Louis Henkin wrote: “[A]lmost 
all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost 
all of their obligations almost all of the time.”8  While not taking issue 
 
statutory questions, L serves as the government’s principal expert in international legal affairs.  
And just as the Solicitor General argues cases for the government before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
L argues on behalf of the United States at the International Court of Justice and other 
international tribunals.  See Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State 
Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 633, 634 (1963). 
 6 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 127 (1921). 
 7 Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International 
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1441 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2). 
 8 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979) 
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with the claim itself, Professor Posner dismisses the importance of 
Henkin’s observation by arguing that this so-called widespread 
compliance only reflects a coincidence of interest.  Posner compares the 
situation to a society where “there are only a few, weak laws that 
already reflect people’s interests—you must eat at least once every day, 
you must wear clothes on cold days.  The observation that people in this 
society frequently obey the law is of little value.”9  To rise to Posner’s 
challenge, the conveners asked the Legal Advisers to focus the 
discussion on the hardest cases—those implicating essential national 
interests in times of international crisis. 
Over the course of the day, each Legal Adviser was asked to 
recount the role that his office and international law played in 
responding to the three most important international crises occurring 
during his tenure.  Each presentation was followed by a series of 
penetrating and provocative questions and comments posed by the other 
Legal Advisers, as well as by the conveners (who had, themselves, 
served as Attorney-Advisers in L during the Bush and Clinton 
Administrations).  The presentations and Q&A were transcribed by a 
court reporter, and the Legal Advisers gave the conveners permission to 
reproduce the complete edited transcript in a forthcoming book to be 
published by Cambridge University Press.10 
While the qualitative empirical data relied on for this Article 
provides a unique perspective into the question of whether international 
law exerts “a compliance pull” on government officials, certain limits 
must be recognized regarding the value of the author’s approach.11  
Since the accounts of the Legal Advisers were not contemporaneous 
with the events that they describe, for example, there is the potential 
that the data has been affected by selective memory and revisionism.  In 
addition, the conference format did not permit the Legal Advisers to 
discuss the role of international law in every crisis on their watch, but 
rather just those each Legal Adviser considered as the major crises, thus 
presenting a narrower and more subjective data set; this methodological 
deficiency was potentially compounded by the author’s selection of the 
quotes from the lengthy transcript of the meeting to reproduce in this 
Article.  Moreover, while L plays an important role with respect to the 
 
(emphasis omitted). 
 9 Posner, supra note 4, at 1916. 
 10 MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF 
CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 
(forthcoming 2010). 
 11 For background about and a critique of qualitative research methods and techniques, see 
MATTHEW B. MILES & A. MICHAEL HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: AN 
EXPANDED SOURCEBOOK (2d ed. 1994); MICHAEL QUINN PATTON, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
AND EVALUATION METHODS (3d ed. 2002); THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
(Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 3d ed. 2005). 
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U.S. government’s interpretation and application of international law, 
there are other legal officers within the bureaucracy (such as at the 
White House, the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Commerce Department), 
whose influence relative to L’s rises and falls depending on the type of 
international issue or political factors. Thus, the focus on L only tells 
part of the story within a disaggregated government.  Finally, the data is 
admittedly U.S.-centric, though the Article also draws from a panel of 
foreign ministry legal advisers from several different countries that the 
author organized in 2005 in an effort to add comparative insights to this 
project. 
In discussing the role of international law during times of crisis, 
five fundamental questions about the nature of international law and the 
role of the Legal Adviser emerged from the day-long colloquy and 
subsequent emails with the Legal Advisers. The first is whether 
international law is really law, such that it should be treated as 
constraining what the United States, as the world’s greatest economic 
and military power, seeks to accomplish on the world stage.  The 
second is whether the international legal rules relevant to a particular 
situation or crisis are ever clear enough to be interpreted as dictating 
how the U.S. Government must act.  The third is whether the Legal 
Adviser has a duty to oppose policies or proposed actions that conflict 
with international law in those situations where such conflict is 
objectively manifest.  The fourth is whether the position taken by the 
Legal Adviser is seen as influential, if not controlling, within the 
government in such situations.  And the fifth is whether international 
law is generally seen by the Legal Advisers to advance or to hinder the 
U.S. government’s interests in times of crisis. 
Before addressing these questions, the Article begins with a review 
of the scholarly debate about the nature of international legal obligation.  
This is followed by a discussion of the results of this study, as well as a 
modern case study involving the treatment of detainees in the war on 
terror which highlights the importance of these findings. 
 
I.     THE COMPLIANCE DEBATE 
 
Since the decline of the Roman Empire and the attendant 
weakening of the Roman Legion at the end of the fourth century A.D. 
there has existed no sort of constabulary to implement rules of 
international law.  Subsequently, international rules have been subject to 
sporadic enforcement through protest and condemnation, reciprocal 
suspension of rights and benefits, unilateral or multilateral economic 
and political sanctions, and sometimes through individual or collective 
SCHARF.31-1 10/1/2009  8:41:58 AM 
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use of armed force. 
Lacking a pervasive and effective enforcement mechanism, 
scholars and policy-makers have pondered whether international law is 
really binding law.  The question has been debated since ancient times 
and remains one of the most contested questions in international 
relations.  As described below, major historic developments, such as the 
Peace of Westphalia, the conclusion of the Second World War, the 
onset of the Cold War, the proliferation of international institutions in 
the 1970s and 80s, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have each rekindled and 
reshaped the debate. 
To understand how the historic context affects the debate about 
whether international law is really law, it is helpful to draw upon the 
theory of Semiotics (pronounced sem-ee-AH-tiks).  Semiotics (from the 
Greek semeion, meaning “sign”) was developed by Charles Peirce in the 
nineteenth century as the study of how meaning of signs, symbols, and 
language is constructed and understood.12  Umberto Eco made a wider 
audience aware of semiotics through several notable books including his 
best-selling novel, The Name of the Rose, which includes applied 
semiotic operations.13 Semiotics begins with the assumption that 
phrases, such as “international law,” are not historic artifacts whose 
meaning remains static over time.  Rather, the meaning of such terms 
changes along with the interpretive community or communities.  As 
applied to law, semiotics theory posits that “different conceptions of the 
nature and character of the legal community give rise to different 
interpretations of the meaning of the rules and principles of positive 
law . . . .”14  Although not himself a semiotician, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes captured the essence of semiotics when he famously observed: 
“The life of the law has not been logic[;] it has been experience.”15 
This Part therefore begins by examining the development of the 
major schools of compliance theory in the context of their historic 
setting and with reference to the relevant interpretive communities.  
Though scholars writing on this subject often perceive or present 
themselves as pure scientists examining the question solely in the 
abstract, the field is more akin to applied science and the conscious or 
subconscious agendas of those writing in it are comprehensible only in 
 
 12 See 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: 
PRAGMATISM AND PRAGMATICISM (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1935). 
 13 UMBERTO ECO, THE NAME OF THE ROSE (1983); UMBERTO ECO, SEMIOTICS AND THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1984); UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (1976). 
 14 Wouter Werner, The Unnamed Third: Roberta Kevelson’s Legal Semiotics and the 
Development of International Law, 12 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 309, 309 (1999); see also Susan W. 
Tiefenbrun, Legal Semiotics, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 89, 92 (1986) (“Legal practice is a 
general exercise in interpretation.”). 
 15 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover 1991) (1881). 
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light of the background events and developments at the time of their 
publications and an understanding of the audience they are seeking to 
influence. With this in mind, the Article then focuses on the 
contemporary debate, while probing the underlying motivations of the 
major participants and their perceptions of the community that they are 
trying to influence with their arguments. 
 
A.     Compliance Theory in Historical Context 
 
The modern age of international law is said to have been 
inaugurated with the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia, which ended the 
Thirty Years War by acknowledging the sovereign authority of various 
European Princes.16  During the next three-hundred years, up until 
World War II, there were four major schools of thought regarding the 
binding nature of international law.17  The first was “an Austinian 
positivistic realist strand,” which held that nations never obey 
international law because it is not really law.18  The second was a 
“Hobbesian utilitarian, rationalistic strand” which held that nations 
sometimes follow international law, but only when it serves their self-
interest to do so.19  The third was a “Kantian liberal strand,” which held 
that nations generally obey international law out of a sense of moral and 
ethical obligation derived from considerations of natural law and 
justice.20  The fourth was a Bentham “process-based strand,” which held 
 
 16 Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENVER J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 373, 375 n.20 (2003) (“The Peace of Westphalia was composed of two separate 
agreements: (1) the Treaty of Osnabruck concluded between the Protestant Queen of Sweden and 
her allies on the one side, and the Holy Roman Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on the 
other; and (2) the Treaty of Munster concluded between the Catholic King of France and his allies 
on the one side, and the Holy Roman Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on the other.  
The Conventional view of the Peace of Westphalia is that by recognizing the German Princes as 
sovereign, these treaties signaled the beginning of a new era.  But in fact, the power to conclude 
alliances formally recognized at Westphalia was not unqualified, and was in fact a power that the 
German Princes had already possessed for almost half a century.  Furthermore, although the 
treaties eroded some of the authority of the Habsburg Emperor, the Empire remained a key actor 
according to the terms of the treaties.  For example, the Imperial Diet retained the powers of 
legislation, warfare, and taxation, and it was through Imperial bodies, such as the Diet and the 
Courts, that religious safeguards mandated by the Treaty were imposed on the German Princes.”). 
 17 Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2613 
(1997). 
 18 Id. at 2611; see also JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 127, 
201 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1954) (1832). 
 19 Koh, supra note 17, at 2611; see also ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE 
LAW OF NATIONS 58-59, 112-25 (1947) (discussing the contributions of Thomas Hobbes and 
other early positivists). 
 20 Koh, supra note 17, at 2611; see also Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical Sketch (1795), reprinted in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 107 (Ted 
Humphrey trans., 1983). 
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that nations are induced to obey from the encouragement and prodding 
of other nations through a discursive legal process.21  The modern 
debate has its roots in these four theoretical approaches. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the victorious Allies sought to 
establish a “new world order,” replacing the “loose customary web of 
state-centric rules” with a rules-based system, built on international 
conventions and international institutions such as the United Nations 
Charter, which created the Security Council, General Assembly, and  
International Court of Justice; the Bretton Woods Agreement, which 
established the World Bank and International Monetary Fund; and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which ultimately led to the 
creation of the World Trade Organization.22   The new system reflected 
a view that international rules would promote Western interests, serve 
as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, and emphasize values to be 
marshaled against fascist threats.23 
Yet the effectiveness of the new system was immediately undercut 
by the intense bipolarity of the Cold War.  In the 1940s, political 
science departments at U.S. universities received from the German 
refugees (such as Hans Morgenthau, who is credited with founding the 
field of international relations in the United States) “an image of 
international law as Weimar law writ large[:] formalistic, moralistic, 
and unable to influence the realities of international life.”24   With fear 
of communist expansion pervading the debate, the positivistic, realist 
strand came to dominate Western scholarly discourse on the nature of 
international obligation.  Thus, one of America’s leading post-war 
international relations theorists, George F. Kennan, attacked the Kantian 
approach as anathema to American foreign policy interests, saying: 
“[T]he belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and 
dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the 
acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints [is an approach 
that] runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty 
years.”25 
Even during the height of the Cold War, however, international 
law had its defenders, and within the American legal academy a new 
school of thought arose with roots in the Bentham strand, based on 
notions of legal process.  Thus, the writings of Harvard Law professors 
 
 21 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 538, 540, 552-54 (John Bowring 
ed., 1843). 
 22 Koh, supra note 17, at 2615.  
 23 Philippe Sands, Mischon Lecture 2005, Lawless World: International Law After 9/11 and 
Iraq (May 18, 2005), available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/mishcon/docs/Mishcon_2005_ 
Sands.pdf. 
 24 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 471 (2001).  
 25 GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 95 (1951). 
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Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas Lowenfeld, and Yale 
Law professors Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, hypothesized 
that compliance with international law could be explained by reference 
to the process by which these actors interact in a variety of public and 
private fora.26  As Abram Chayes, who had himself once served as State 
Department Legal Adviser, put it: international law may not be 
determinative in international affairs, but it is relevant and influences 
foreign policy “first, as a constraint on action; second, as the basis of 
justification or legitimization for action; and third, as providing 
organizational structures, procedures, and forums” within which 
political decisions may be reached.27  The process approach was later 
refined by Harvard Law Professors Henry Steiner and Detlev Vagts and 
Yale Law Professor Harold Koh.  This approach includes, in addition to 
States and international organizations, multinational enterprises, 
nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals, which all 
interact in a variety of domestic and international fora to make, 
interpret, internalize, and enforce rules of international law.28 
During the 1970s and 80s, the legal landscape underwent another 
major transformation, with the proliferation, growth, and strengthening 
of countless international regimes and institutions.  Despite the 
bipolarity of the Cold War, international cooperation had persisted, and 
was facilitated by treaties and organizations providing channels for 
dispute-settlement, requiring States to furnish information regarding 
compliance, and authorizing retaliatory actions in cases of non-
compliance. During this period, international relations scholars 
developed “regime theory,” the study of principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures that govern such areas as international 
peacekeeping and debt management.29  At heart, the regime theorists 
were rationalists, viewing compliance with international law as a 
function of the benefits such compliance provides. 
This same period saw a revival of the Kantian philosophical 
tradition.  N.Y.U. Law Professor Thomas Frank sought to answer the 
question, “Why do powerful nations obey powerless rules?,” in his 
path-breaking The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations.30  Frank’s 
 
 26 Professor Koh distinguishes between the Harvard and Yale methods, observing that the 
Harvard approach focused on process as policy constraint while the New Haven approach was 
more value-oriented, focusing on process as policy justification.  Koh, supra note 17, at 2623. 
 27 ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF 
LAW 7 (1974); see also ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1968) 
(containing cases and materials demonstrating the “legal process” approach). 
 28 HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
PROBLEMS (4th ed. 1994). 
 29 See INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THEORY (1989). 
 30 THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3 (1990). 
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answer: “Because they perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra 
to have a high degree of legitimacy.”31  According to Frank, it is the 
legitimacy of the process that “exerts a pull to compliance.” 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1989 had a significant effect on compliance scholarship.  With the 
dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the end of Apartheid in South Africa, 
and the United Nation’s defeat of Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert 
Storm, the 1990s were a period of unparalleled optimism about the 
prospects of international law and international institutions.  At the 
same time, conflict in failed States like Somalia and Haiti, the violent 
break up of the former Yugoslavia, and the tribal carnage in Rwanda 
presented new challenges that severely tested the efficacy of 
international rules and institutions.  Meanwhile, the status of the United 
States as the “sole remaining superpower” encouraged triumphalism, 
exceptionalism, and an upsurge of U.S. provincialism and isolationism, 
as well as a preference to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally.32  
During this decade, scholarly writing about compliance with 
international law featured four prevailing views. 
The first was an “instrumentalist” strand which, like its 
predecessors, applied rational choice theory to argue that States only 
obey international law when it serves their self-interest to do so.  What 
differentiated modern rationalists such as Robert Keohane,33 Duncan 
Snidal,34 Kenneth Abbott,35 and John Setear36 from their realist 
forerunners was the sophistication of their version of the prisoner’s 
dilemma game, introducing international institutions and transnational 
actors, disaggregating the State into its component parts, and 
incorporating notions of long-term as well as short-term interests. 
The second was a “liberal internationalist” strand, led by the Dean 
of Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, Anne-Marie Slaughter, who 
posited that compliance depends on whether or not the State can be 
characterized as “liberal” in identity (e.g., marked by a democratic 
representative government, guarantees of civil and political rights, and 
an independent judicial system).37  Slaughter and other liberal theorists 
 
 31 Id. at 25. 
 32 JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS 7 (2004). 
 33 Robert O. Keohane, Jr., International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, Sherrill 
Lecture at Yale Law School (Feb. 22, 1996), quoted in Koh, supra note 17, at 2632 n.171.  
 34 Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International 
Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985). 
 35 Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for 
International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335 (1989). 
 36 John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations 
Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 139 (1996). 
 37 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
503 (1995). 
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argued that liberal democracies are more likely to comply with 
international law in their relations with one another, while relations 
between liberal and illiberal States will more likely be conducted 
without serious deference to international law. 
The third, an outgrowth of Kantian theory, was a “constructivist” 
strand, which argued that the norms of international law, the values of 
the international community, and the structure of international society 
have the power to reshape national interests.38  According to the 
constructivists, States obey international rules because a repeated habit 
of obedience transforms their interests so that they come to value rule 
compliance. 
The fourth post-Cold War approach was a refurbishment of the 
Harvard/New Haven “institutionalist approach,” as embodied in works 
by Abram and Antonia Chayes and Harold Koh.  In The New 
Sovereignty, the Chayeses dismiss the importance of coercive 
enforcement, pointing out that “sanctioning authority is rarely granted 
by treaty, rarely used when granted, and likely to be ineffective when 
used.”39  Instead, they offer a “management model” in which 
compliance is induced through interactive processes of justification, 
discourse, and persuasion.  According to the Chayeses, the impetus for 
compliance is not so much a nation’s fear of sanction as it is fear of 
diminution of status through loss of reputation.  To improve 
compliance, the Chayeses propose a range of “instruments of active 
management,” such as transparency, reporting and data collection, 
verification and monitoring, dispute settlement, capacity-building, and 
strategic review and assessment. 
Harold Koh, who was appointed State Department Legal Adviser 
of the Obama Administration in 2009, has sought to add an additional 
level of sophistication to process theory by explaining how and why 
States internalize the constraining norms through judicial incorporation, 
legislative embodiment, and executive acceptance.40  According to Koh, 
when a State fails to comply with international law, frictions are created 
that can negatively affect the conduct of a State’s foreign relations and 
frustrate its foreign policy goals.  To avoid such frictions in its 
continuing interactions, the State will shift over time from a policy of 
violation to one of grudging compliance to eventual habitual 
 
 38 THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 17-19 
(Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996); INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 4-8 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996); FRIEDRICH V. 
KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND 
LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS (1989). 
 39 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 32-33, 197 (1995). 
 40 Koh, supra note 17, at 2602-03, 2641.  
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internalized obedience.41 
 
B.     The Compliance Debate after 9/11 
 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon of 
September 11, 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 inaugurated 
the current period of compliance scholarship.  In the aftermath of 9/11, 
the United States launched a “preventive war” against Iraq that was 
widely viewed outside the United States as unjustifiable under 
international law and then implemented policies regarding the detention 
and treatment of suspected terrorists that were harshly criticized as 
inconsistent with international law requirements.  In seeking to 
minimize the impact of international law on the Bush Administration’s 
foreign policy agenda, then Ambassador to the United Nations, John 
Bolton, said:  
It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law 
even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so—because, 
over the long term, the goal of those who think that international law 
really means anything are those who want to constrict the United 
States.42 
The term “lawfare” was coined,43 and the Bush Administration’s official 
National Defense Strategy compared the use of international “judicial 
processes” to terrorism, concluding that both are “strateg[ies] of the 
weak” that threaten “[o]ur strength as a nation state.”44  The 
Administration even persuaded Congress to enact legislation that 
prohibited U.S. courts from considering international law or 
jurisprudence in determining the validity of detentions of suspected 
terrorists at Guantanamo Bay.45 
It was in this context that Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith, 
who had served as Assistant Attorney General and head of the 
 
 41 Id. at 2655-56. 
 42 Samantha Power, Boltonism, NEW YORKER, Mar. 21, 2005, at 23, available at 
http://newyorker.com/archive/2005/03/21/050321ta_talk_power. 
 43 The term was apparently coined by Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.—at a speech at 
Harvard’s Carr Center in 2001—who now defines it as “the strategy of using—or misusing—law 
as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.”  Major General 
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Prospective, YALE J. INT’L AFFAIRS, Winter 2008, at 
146, 146.  As neoconservative lawyers David Rivkin and Lee Casey have put it, lawfare aims to 
“gain a moral advantage over your enemy in the court of world opinion, and potentially a legal 
advantage in national and international tribunals.”  Scott Horton, State of Exception: Bush’s War 
on the Rule of Law, HARPER’S, July 2007, at 74, 74, available at http://www.harpers.org/ 
archive/2007/07/0081595.  
 44 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 6 (2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408 
strategy.pdf. 
 45 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
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Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from 
October 2003 to June 2004, along with Chicago University Law 
Professor Eric Posner, published The Limits of International Law at the 
start of the Bush Administration’s second term in 2005.46  The book, 
which is an expanded and more sophisticated version of Posner’s 2003 
article, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International 
Law?,47 deploys economic-based rational choice theory, using modeling 
techniques derived from game theory, to advance the thesis that neither 
customary international law nor treaty-based international law have any 
“exogenus influence on state behavior.”48  In other words, according to 
Goldsmith and Posner, when States act in accordance with international 
law it is not because of its moral pull or a preference for abiding with 
law, but rather solely due to self-interest.49 
Using a variety of illustrative historical case studies involving 
international agreements (e.g., human rights treaties and trade treaties) 
as well as customary international law (e.g., ambassadorial immunity 
and free passage of neutral ships), Goldsmith and Posner propound four 
models that seek to explain away the behavior that legal scholars have 
termed “compliance” with international law. The first model, 
“coincidence,” proposes that States may act in accordance with 
international law simply by acting in their own self-interest, with no 
regard to international rules or the interests of other States.  The second 
model, “coordination,” describes instances in which two or more States 
create and abide by a rule not out of a sense of obligation, but simply 
because it is convenient.  The third model, “cooperation,” applies to 
situations in which States reciprocally refrain from activities that would 
otherwise be in their short-term self-interest in order to reap larger long-
term benefits.  The fourth model, “coercion,” results when a State with 
greater power forces a weaker State to engage in acts that benefit the 
more powerful State. 
Based on their rational choice analysis, Goldsmith and Posner 
conclude that States have no preference for compliance with 
international law; they are unaffected by the “legitimacy” of a rule of 
law; past consent to a rule does not generate compliance; and decision 
makers do not internalize a norm of compliance with international law.  
States therefore employ international law when it is convenient, are free 
to ignore it when it is not, and have every right to place their sovereign 
interests first—indeed democratic States have an obligation to do so 
when international law threatens to undermine federalism, separation of 
 
 46 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2.  
 47 Posner, supra note 4, at 1918.   
 48 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 43.  
 49 Id. at 225. 
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powers, and domestic sovereignty.50 
In The Terror Presidency, a 2007 memoir of his days as one of the 
Bush Administration’s top lawyers, Goldsmith candidly reveals the 
underlying normative purpose behind The Limits of International Law.  
Goldsmith writes:  
Many people think the Bush administration has been indifferent to 
wartime legal constraints.  But the opposite is true: the 
administration has been strangled by law, and since September 11, 
2001, this war has been lawyered to death.  The administration has 
paid attention to law not necessarily because it wanted to, but rather 
because it [believed that it] had no choice.”51   
While Special Counsel to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and 
later as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the OLC, Goldsmith 
saw it as his mission to convince those inside the government that 
international rules that constrain U.S. power and thus compromise 
national security are not really binding.  A 2003 inter-agency memo 
prepared by Goldsmith on “the judicialization of international 
politics,”52 warns: “In the past quarter century, various nations, NGOs, 
academics, international organizations, and others in the ‘international 
community’ have been busily weaving a web of international laws and 
judicial institutions that today threatens [U.S. government] 
interests.”53   The memo continues: “The [U.S. government] has 
seriously underestimated this threat, and has mistakenly assumed that 
confronting the threat will worsen it . . . .  Unless we tackle the problem 
head-on, it will continue to grow.  The issue is especially urgent 
because of the unusual challenges we face in the war on terrorism.”54  
The Limits of International Law can therefore be understood as 
Goldsmith’s effort to bring this “anti-lawfare” argument to a wider 
audience. 
As Professor Allen Buchanan of Duke University has pointed out, 
Goldsmith and Posner’s “normative claims, if valid, would lend support 
to the view that it is wholly permissible for the U.S. government to take 
a purely instrumental stance toward international law, and that its 
citizens do not have a moral obligation to try to prevent their 
government from doing so.”55  Similarly, Professor Oona Hathaway of 
Yale Law School has concluded that there is a necessary connection 
 
 50 Goldsmith and Posner are particularly concerned about international law’s propensity to 
shift decisional authority from local government and the federal executive to international 
institutions and activist federal judges. 
 51 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 69 (2007). 
 52 Id. at 63. 
 53 Id. at 60. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L  
COMP. L. 305, 307-08 (2006). 
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between Goldsmith and Posner’s underlying “revisionist” political 
agenda and their book’s methodological approach and conclusions.56  
And as Professor Margaret McGuinness of the University of Missouri-
Columbia observes: “[T]he book cannot be viewed as separate from the 
authors’ broader normative project—a project that seeks to minimize 
U.S. participation in international institutions and to limit the 
application of international law in the United States by expanding 
presidential power and limiting the role of the judiciary.”57  Finally, 
Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell of Notre Dame warns: “A policy-
maker reading the book might well conclude that compliance with 
international law, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the 
Convention against Torture, is optional . . . .”58 
While many realists and rationalists immediately embraced 
Goldsmith and Posner’s approach and conclusions, their book was met 
with criticism by institutionalists and constructivists, who sought to 
disprove their thesis in several ways.  To start with, Professor Peter 
Spiro of Temple University points out that many of Goldsmith and 
Posner’s reasons for dismissing international law as something less than 
real law would apply to domestic law as well.  Their assertion that 
“[d]omestic law is enforced in well-ordered societies,” whereas 
“international law is not reliably enforced,”59 flies in the face of the 
actual data, including the fact that murder cases have only a sixty-five 
percent clearance rate in the United States.60 
Although international law has traditionally employed horizontal 
rather than vertical mechanisms of enforcement (such as protests, 
reciprocal suspension of compliance, and breaking of diplomatic 
relations) and such enforcement has rarely been bolstered by the use of 
force, this “does not necessarily detract from its salience as a regulator 
of behavior.”61  It just means international law is more like domestic 
contract law than domestic tort or criminal law.  And while some States 
violate the Torture Convention’s prohibitions on inhumane treatment, 
the Geneva Convention’s prohibition on war crimes, and the U.N. 
Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, this does not mean that these 
international rules have no consequence.  As with the sixty-five m.p.h. 
speed limit, international law may not exert a moral pull nor enjoy 
perfect compliance, but it does deter and constrain unlawful behavior at 
 
 56 Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 7, at 1404.  
 57 Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights Law, 34 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 421 (2006). 
 58 MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 
(2009). 
 59 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 195. 
 60 Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 445, 452 
n.16 (2006). 
 61 Id. at 451. 
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the margins.  Finally, while nearly all international law scholars will 
acknowledge that if State interests are powerful enough, they may 
trump contrary international law norms, the same is true with respect to 
contracts in domestic law.  That a business or individual may choose to 
break a legally binding contract (and suffer the consequences thereof) 
does not mean that contract law is not real law. 
Another criticism of the Goldsmith/Posner paradigm, made by 
Professor Kenneth Anderson of American University, concerns their 
underlying assumption that the only possible basis of legal obligation is 
morality.  Anderson points out that a sense of legal obligation can be 
based on instrumentalist concerns about reputation as a law-abiding 
State, long-term self-interest in the maintenance of order, or long-term 
self-interest in a functioning legal system.  In seeking to circumvent this 
objection, Goldsmith and Posner never explain what they believe 
constitutes the self-interests of States.  Rather, they provide a circular 
approach that is so open-ended that it renders their theory “an empty 
vessel.”62  In particular, critics argue that by defining reputation as one 
of a State’s instrumentalist interests rather than considering it part of the 
pull of international law, Goldsmith and Posner have rendered their 
theory non-falsifiable and lacking in predictive value.  As Professor 
Daniel Bodanski of the University of Georgia notes, under Goldsmith 
and Posner’s approach, “international law cannot be an exogenous 
influence on state behavior for the simple reason that it has already been 
made endogenous.”63 
Goldsmith and Posner attempt to answer this criticism by 
observing that in any event, reputational considerations have little 
impact on State behavior.  But Professor David M. Golove of N.Y.U. 
takes issue with this supposition, which arises out of Goldsmith and 
Posner’s single-issue game approach using the prisoner’s dilemma 
model.  According to Professor Golove, the metaphorical games that 
States actually play are vastly more complex.  “States repeatedly and 
intensively interact across a wide range of subject areas, and they do so 
indefinitely into the future.”64  Viewing international interaction instead 
as a “super game” requires that significantly more value be placed on 
reputation than Goldsmith and Posner are willing to acknowledge.  
States obtain a benefit if they are perceived as reliable partners not just 
with the particular State on the particular issue in question in a given 
interaction, but also with third States on a range of issues long into the 
 
 62 Kenneth Anderson, Remarks by an Idealist on the Realism of The Limits of International 
Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 280-81 (2006). 
 63 Daniel Bodansky, International Law in Black and White, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285, 
295 (2006). 
 64 David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is: Goldsmith and 
Posner’s The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 333, 345 (2006). 
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future.  Moreover, once a norm is named a customary international law 
rule or is codified in a treaty to which a State is a party, violation of that 
norm will have far more serious reputational costs.65 
Goldsmith and Posner’s response is to argue that State reputations 
are compartmentalized.  For example, they assert that a State might 
have a good record complying with trade treaties and a bad record 
complying with environmental treaties, and that the State’s trading 
partners will not hold its environmental shortcomings against it.66  If 
this were true, answers Golove, it would only mean that preserving the 
State’s reputation as a law-abiding State would be more significant with 
respect to that State’s trade relations than in the environmental domain; 
it would not mean that reputation is irrelevant.  Nor does their self-
evident assertion that “a reputation for compliance will not always be of 
paramount concern”67 mean that reputation should automatically be 
dismissed as inconsequential.  If compliance reputation makes a 
difference at the margins, putting a thumb on the scale in favor of 
compliance, then it is neither irrelevant nor inconsequential. 
A further criticism of the Goldsmith/Posner approach is that in 
order to fit within their simplified prisoner dilemma game theory, they 
begin with the assumption that the relevant actor is the “State” as a 
unitary player, represented by what Goldsmith and Posner call its 
leaders.  The State as they conceive it does not reflect multiple power 
bases and multiple agendas.  To better mirror reality, Professor Spiro 
suggests that the State should be disaggregated and understood as a 
nexus of competing and contradictory actors which influence its 
behavior, including bureaucratic subsets within the Executive Branch, 
political subsets within the Congress, Supreme Court and lower court 
judges in the Judiciary Branch, and nongovernmental organizations 
outside the government.68 
A final critique concerns Goldsmith and Posner’s methodology.  
According to Professor Andrew T. Guzman of U.C. Berkely’s Boalt 
Hall School of Law, Goldsmith and Posner’s aim is to debunk the 
constructivist theory of compliance, but they do so through selective use 
of a handful of case studies which are no more than anecdotal in nature, 
and their identification of the controlling state interests in each is almost 
entirely conjectural.  In addition, they offer no explanation for how they 
chose the particular historical events that they employ, nor do they cite 
to other scholars of history or political science who concur with their 
 
 65 Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 
1294 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2). 
 66 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 102. 
 67 Id. at 103. 
 68 Spiro, supra note 60, at 454-62; Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in 
International Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 195. 
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appraisals of those events. In contrast, several scholars that have 
carefully examined the case studies set forth in The Limits of 
International Law have concluded that “at least some of those case 
studies are consistent with competing claims.”69 
Moreover, where a case study reveals a State’s compliance with an 
accepted rule (as most of Goldsmith and Posner’s do), it is difficult to 
determine without qualitative empirical data (which Goldsmith and 
Posner do not provide) whether the State complied out of self-interest, 
out of a sense of duty to uphold the law, or a mix of both.  As Professor 
Oona Hathaway points out, with respect to international law—which is 
primarily consent-based—“utility-seeking and law-abiding behavior 
will often be one and the same.”70  Professor Golove observes that 
“Goldsmith and Posner make little effort to investigate direct historical 
evidence . . . of the actual motivations of the individuals who made the 
decisions on which they focus.  Instead they focus on the events 
themselves and draw speculative inferences about why [S]tates acted as 
they did.”71  By employing the qualitative empirical data obtained from 
the day-long conference of State Department Legal Advisers and 
follow-up emails, this project seeks to fill the void, enabling the reader 
to discern which side of the debate better reflects reality. 
 
II.     FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
A.     L’s View of International Law 
 
This Article began with five questions about the nature of 
international law and the role of the State Department Legal Adviser.  
The following answers emerged from the discourse with the ten former 
State Department Legal Advisers. 
 
1.     Did the Legal Advisers perceive international law to be binding 
law? 
 
Since the dawn of the Cold War, there has been a rich tradition of 
skepticism about the “legality” of international law on both ends of the 
 
 69 Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise of International Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 533, 540 (2006) 
(book review) (arguing that Goldsmith and Posner misrepresent the facts in their international 
trade case study); see also Golove, supra note 64, at 353 (arguing that Goldsmith and Posner’s 
account is cherry-picked and fails to present a fair picture of the “free ships, free goods” 
example).  
 70 Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 7, at 1416 n.35.  
 71 Golove, supra note 64, at 348.   
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political spectrum.  This Article begins with a quote from John Bolton, 
the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. during the Bush Administration, who 
declared: “International law is not law; it is a series of political and 
moral arrangements that stand or fall on their own merits, and anything 
else is simply theology and superstition masquerading as law.”72  None 
of the ten former State Department Legal Advisers would agree with 
that proposition.  They all perceived international law as real law that is 
binding on the United States and operates as a constraint on policy-
makers, even where there are important national security interests at 
stake.73  Moreover, even where international law seemed in the short-
term to hinder U.S. foreign policy goals, the Legal Advisers agreed that 
America’s longer-term interests in protecting U.S. citizens abroad and 
in effectively conducting foreign policy counsel for policies that uphold 
the integrity and stability of international law. 
At the same time, they acknowledged that their clients were often 
leery of the relevance of international law, and with few exceptions, 
there were no extant domestic or international institutions with authority 
to opine on the legality of a particular U.S. foreign policy decision.  
This does not mean, however, that the Legal Advisers did not perceive 
that there were serious consequences that flow from violating bilateral 
treaties, multilateral conventions, or rules of customary international 
law.  The Legal Advisers all recognized (and advised policy-makers) 
that violations can engender international condemnation, strain relations 
with allies, and interfere with the ability of the United States to obtain 
international support for important policy initiatives, such as fighting 
international terrorism, suppressing narcotics trafficking, controlling 
weapons of mass destruction, and achieving fair and free trade.  
Moreover, the Legal Advisers recognized that when a State elects to 
ignore or reinterpret an existing international rule according to its own 
short-term interests, it runs the risk of being unable to invoke the rule in 
the future, to its ultimate detriment. 
 
 
 72 Bolton, supra note 1, at 48.  
 73 As former Acting Legal Adviser Michael Matheson explained:  
I agree that the use-of-force cases are rather unusual situations where typically 
Presidents make decisions on the basis of what they consider to be overwhelming 
national security needs.  And I agree on the other hand, that Presidents and other 
foreign policy decision-makers are perfectly willing to accept that they are more 
constrained in other areas by international law norms.  This is certainly true in 
economic affairs and other situations where there are treaty obligations, such as 
environmental obligations.  So there really is a spectrum in which perhaps only on the 
extreme end of the spectrum does international law always win the day, but even on 
other parts of the spectrum, international law is a definite constraint on policy makers. 
Michael Matheson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference of Former Legal Advisers at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (Apr. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Day-Long Conference], in 
SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 14.  
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2.     Are international legal rules ever clear enough to constrain policy 
preferences? 
 
The Legal Advisers all stressed that the vagueness of many areas 
of international law provided States with a great deal of latitude in 
foreign affairs.  This was seen to be equally true with respect to treaty 
provisions and unwritten customary international law.  Further, as 
political appointees (as opposed to career civil servants or foreign 
service officers), most of the Legal Advisers acknowledged that where 
international law is unsettled or legitimately open to differing 
interpretations, they would naturally favor the interpretation most 
consonant with the course of action advocated by policy-makers.  
Moreover, the Legal Advisers suggested that to maintain their clout 
within the Department it was important for L to be seen as trying to find 
a solution for every difficulty rather than a difficulty for every solution.  
As an example of such creativity, David Andrews described the 
catalogue of justifications L crafted for the 1999 NATO intervention to 
halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo as “putting new wine into old bottles.”74 
Historically, the United States government has never taken the 
position that international law is not binding upon it (though some Bush 
Administration officials came close in opining that the Geneva 
Conventions were outmoded in an age of global terrorism75).  Nor has 
the United States ever openly admitted that it has breached international 
law, preferring instead to cloak what others view as transgressions in 
the rhetoric of permissible interpretations or exceptions.  There was a 
limit, however, to how far the Legal Advisers were willing to push the 
bounds of interpretation to circumvent the law. 
Under the international law principle of reciprocity, “what’s good 
for the goose is good for the gander,” meaning that other States can use 
American arguments to justify their actions when roles are reversed.  
While Goldsmith and Posner focus solely on bilateral reciprocity, the 
Legal Advisers suggested that “multilateral” or “systemic” reciprocity is 
also of concern.76  If the United States ignores or interprets away a rule 
of international law, the precedent will be used by other States in the 
international community, both with respect to their relations with the 
United States and with each other, thereby weakening the general rule 
 
 74 Id., ch. 17. 
 75 E.g., Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to U.S. President 
George W. Bush, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the 
Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum], 
available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70952/00173_020125_001display.pdf. 
 76 For a detailed explanation of the concept of “systemic reciprocity,” see MARK OSIEL, THE 
END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE LAW OF WAR 368 (2009). 
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of law and rendering the international system less stable.  As an 
example, in 2008, Russia cited the precedent of the 1999 NATO 
bombing campaign in Serbia to halt ethnic cleansing as its legal 
rationale for invading the Republic of Georgia to halt violence against 
ethnic Russians in the province of South Ossetia.77 
 
3.     Does the Legal Adviser have a duty to oppose proposed actions 
that conflict with international law? 
 
One school of thought is that it is not the Legal Adviser’s job to 
render “impartial” advice, any more than a corporate lawyer is expected 
to do so.  The Government wants its international lawyer to promote 
rather than judge the aims of the administration.78  A competing school 
maintains that the Legal Adviser has a special or higher professional 
responsibility to provide a disinterested assessment because his advice 
is not normally tested in courts of law or by other outside checks.79  The 
following colloquy in answer to the query, “Who did you perceive as 
your client?,” sheds light on the answer to the question of whether the 
Legal Adviser has a duty to oppose proposed actions that would clearly 
violate international law: 
  Abe Sofaer [Reagan and Bush Administrations]: [O]ne example 
of an instance in my career at L where this issue of who is the client 
arose very dramatically was during the Iran-Contra episode.  I was 
working to try to stop the lies that were going on—the stonewalling 
that was going on in the Reagan administration about Iran- 
Contra. . . .  And Schultz was led at a meeting to ask me point-blank 
the question you just asked.  He said, “Who do you represent, 
Sofaer?  Are you my lawyer?  Whose lawyer are you?”   
 And I said, “I am the lawyer of the President of the United States.  
He’s my client and through him, the people of the United States and 
the Congress of the United States. . . .” 
  Davis Robinson [Reagan Administration]: I think it’s a very 
fundamental question—and of course, if you’re going to survive as 
Legal Adviser, the Secretary of State had better also be your client—
internally, again, within the department. . . .  The Legal Adviser’s 
office for many years was viewed in the government at large as the 
moral conscience of American foreign policy.  That may be a 
grandiose view of one’s role, but it was impressed upon me that the 
Legal Adviser has got to see to the observation of all of the 
 
 77 JIM NICHOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RUSSIA-GEORGIA CONFLICT IN SOUTH OSSETIA: 
CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS 18 (Sept. 22, 2008), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110841.pdf. 
 78 Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal Advisers and Foreign Affairs, 59 AM. J. INT’L L. 72, 73 (1965). 
 79 John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in 
Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992) (book review).  
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international agreements, the treaties, the customary international 
law—and so, the client is certainly the President.  I would agree with 
Abe that if there is a conflict between the President and the Secretary 
of State—and that does indeed occur (and having been the Legal 
Adviser to Alexander Haig, I can assure you that it occurred with 
some frequency . . .)—you’d better then cast your lot with the 
President.  But then you’ve also got a duty to the Senate, which 
confirmed you.  You’ve got a duty to the public.  It’s an extremely 
difficult question to answer and one that Legal Advisers should lose 
sleep over—and I think that probably every single one of us did on 
occasion. 
  Conrad Harper [Clinton Administration]: . . .  On a work-a-day 
basis, plainly the Secretary of State is the client.  In the event of a 
fundamental disagreement between the Secretary and the Legal 
Adviser, then of course the Legal Adviser’s allegiance must go to the 
President.  In the event of a fundamental disagreement with the 
President, then there is always of course the possibility of resignation 
on the one hand, but on the other there is the notion that there may be 
obligations to the Senate as the representative of the sovereignty—
because, of course, in our system the sovereignty is with the people. 
  Edwin Williamson [Bush Administration]: I really beg to differ.  I 
think your client is the State Department, and the person ultimately 
with the decision is the Secretary of State.  Perhaps through the 
Secretary you serve the President, but I emphasize that [is] through 
the [S]ecretary . . . . 
  Michael Matheson [Bush and Clinton Administrations]: I don’t 
think it’s useful to think of this in terms of lawyer/client 
relationships.  I think that lawyers in public service are public 
officials and they have responsibilities parallel to those [that] other 
public officials have.  An intelligence officer has a duty to give the 
best reading of the facts in a situation that he can, regardless of what 
his clients (if you want to call them that) want to hear.  It’s the same 
for a lawyer.  He has a duty to give honest legal advice and not to 
change it based upon what the client may expect or desire.  So I 
would say that in that sense, a government lawyer has a duty to the 
entire body of the public even though he obviously has direct 
working relationships with a hierarchy in his own agency. 
  Conrad Harper [Clinton Administration]: . . .  Herb Wexler was 
very troubled by the fact that he knew, having worked in the War 
Department and then the Justice Department, that there had been 
misrepresentation at a fundamental level in the Japanese relocation 
cases.  And for many, many years his view was that he could not 
speak because of the duty of confidentiality in the attorney-client 
privilege.  But there came a time when he believed that the claims of 
history and justice required that he come forth—and that’s what I 
have in mind.  At some point, depending on how serious the case is, 
one’s obligations may run in fact to the sovereignty. 
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  Herb Hansel [Carter Administration]: I think that Mike Matheson 
has it right.  To me, a number of different strains run through this 
question: who is the employer, to whom do you owe a duty[] of 
loyalty—but in the end, if there are disagreements up and down the 
line, the public interest is in the mind of the lawyer, and this applies 
to all lawyers that serve the public, not just at the State Department 
and not just the Legal Adviser.  Clearly the ultimate decision has to 
be what’s in the best interest of the public.  It’s important to keep in 
mind, as has already been said, that in 99.9% of the daily tasks, it’s 
the Secretary of State or other officers of the Department for whom 
the Legal Adviser works; but ultimately it’s the body of the public. 
  David Andrews [Clinton Administration]: . . . I [have to] agree 
with Ed . . . I [understood] my responsibilities were to the Secretary 
of . . . State and through her to the President.  And for issues such as 
Conrad [Harper] mentions, those are the kinds of issues where 
resignation is the right path.  If you have privilege and confidentiality 
problems, then you obviously do what Mr. Wexler did; but I think 
that if you feel a duty to resign, then it arises from the obligation to 
the people.80 
When consulted at an early stage, the Legal Advisers saw their 
initial responsibility as providing a candid opinion of what the legal 
situation was, as well as spelling out the possible consequences for 
violating international law in the particular area and advocating policy 
choices that would not violate international law.  Later, most of the 
Legal Advisers seemed quite comfortable to switch hats and play the 
role of advocate for the U.S. position, defending the decision made by 
policy-makers, even if the Legal Adviser personally thought it was at 
odds with international law.  As Michael Matheson put it, “The Legal 
Adviser gives legal advice before decisions are made; he gives the best 
possible legal defense for the decision once it has been made; and he 
contributes to solving practical problems with his lawyering skills.”81  
Even as national advocates, however, the Legal Advisers indicated that 
they sought to shape their arguments with an eye to interpreting rules in 
the manner most beneficial to the long-term and broad national 
interest.82 
 
 80 Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 14. 
 81 Michael Matheson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.  
 82 In discussing the rationale L articulated for the Kosovo intervention, Michael Matheson 
concluded: 
[W]hat this all illustrates is that although L doesn’t really ever make a decision as to 
whether to use force or not; nonetheless, it does have a significant impact on how the 
decision is articulated, and that can be important in terms of what precedents are or are 
not created for the future.  At the time, the concern was that if we articulated the broad 
self-defense or the humanitarian intervention rationale, it might be misused by others. 
Id. ch. 11.  
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4.     How influential is the advice of the Legal Adviser? 
 
There were times in each of the Legal Advisers’ tenure where they 
advised against a course of action that they perceived to be in violation 
of international law.  The clarity of a given international legal standard 
affected the degree to which each Legal Adviser was inclined to take 
such a position or how strongly to advocate it.  Thus, the factors the 
Legal Advisers said they take into account in deciding whether to opine 
that a proposed course of action would violate international law include: 
the extent to which the relevant rules of international law are 
unambiguous, well established, and broadly accepted; as well as the 
extent to which an international or domestic forum exists that can 
pronounce judgment on the correctness of the administration’s 
interpretation of the law in question.  The Legal Advisers recognized, 
moreover, that the ability to claim that an act is not in violation of 
international law is limited by the credulity of both the domestic and 
international legal communities, as reflected in the public statements of 
governments, NGOs, international organizations, and scholars. 
Generally speaking, policy-makers tended to accord substantial 
weight to L’s legal opinions. The Legal Advisers mentioned several 
instances, including some cases involving questions of use of force, 
where policy-makers reluctantly heeded their legal advice despite policy 
preferences to the contrary.83  Roberts Owen, for example, related the 
story of how in the middle of the Iranian hostage crisis, the policy-
makers decided not to use force against the Iranian embassy in 
Washington because “Secretary Vance was a good law-abiding lawyer 
and, based on L’s advice, he concluded that Iran’s wrongdoing wouldn’t 
justify wrongdoing by the United States.”84 
Abe Sofaer recalled how he successfully convinced the policy-
makers not to attack Libya after it was disclosed that Libya had 
provided confiscated Tunisian passports to the terrorists that attacked 
airline passengers at the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985, because the 
United States had not yet publicly articulated its position that States that 
support terrorists would be subject to attack, and because it “had not 
fully exhausted non-forcible options.”85  In another case that same year, 
 
 83 As Abe Sofaer remarked: “I’m sure each one of us at one point or another has advised our 
clients not to use force in a situation and our advice was taken.  Certainly it happened for me at 
least twice, and once at the very highest level imaginable.”  Abe Sofaer, Remarks at Day-Long 
Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 14.  
 84 Roberts Owen, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, 
supra note 10, ch. 17.  
 85 Abe Sofaer, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, 
supra note 10, ch. 17.  After such a warning had been issued and peaceful means exhausted, 
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Sofaer described how, following L’s advice, President Reagan ordered 
U.S. fighter jets to divert an Egyptian airliner carrying the terrorist 
mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking to a NATO base in Italy, but 
“did not authorize the use of force in the event it did not comply.”86  
Further, because the agreement governing the base precluded any non-
NATO operation without Italy’s consent, L advised and the President 
reluctantly agreed that “we had no legal alternative to turning over the 
terrorists” to the Italian authorities rather than seeking to transport them 
to the United States for prosecution.87 
Conrad Harper, in turn, recounted:  
While I was Legal Adviser during the spring of 1994, the United 
States agreed to supply the Peruvian Air Force with real-time 
intelligence, which ultimately resulted in the Peruvian Air Force 
mistakenly shooting down a civilian aircraft.  My office informed the 
policy makers that this policy could not sustain itself under the 
Chicago Convention, and the practice was thereafter reluctantly 
discontinued.88 
The importance of these incidents is manifest, for until now, 
scholars such as Goldsmith and Posner could only attempt to ascertain 
the role that international law played by examining the overt actions of 
the United States.  The meeting of former Legal Advisers disclosed for 
the first time several instances in which policy-makers decided to 
forego the use of force as an option based on arguments that such action 
under the circumstances would violate international law. 
In a particularly telling episode related by John Bellinger, L 
convinced the White House to issue a Presidential Memorandum to 
implement the International Court of Justice’s decision in the 
Avena/Medellin case.  The memo exhorted state courts to give effect to 
the ICJ’s judgment that a new trial was necessary because the Texas 
authorities had not apprised the Mexican defendant of his right to 
consult a consular officer at the time of arrest as required by the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations.  According to Bellinger: 
[T]he significance of President Bush’s decision cannot be overstated, 
given that the President was the former Governor of Texas and a 
supporter of the death penalty and that Mr. Medellin had been 
convicted of an especially grisly crime in Texas—the rape and 
murder of two teenage girls.  Ordering review of his conviction and 
sentence in order to comply with a decision by an international 
 
however, with Sofaer’s full support, the United States did launch an airstrike against Libya in 
response to Libyan involvement in the 1986 LaBelle Disco bombing in Germany, in which 
several U.S. service members were killed.  Id. ch. 7. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Conrad Harper, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.  
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tribunal in The Hague was not a popular decision in Texas.89 
Although the strategy ultimately failed when the Supreme Court ruled 
that without federal legislation the President did not have the authority 
to implement a non-self-executing treaty and override the Tenth 
Amendment rights of Texas,90 it is significant that the Bush 
Administration argued tenaciously in its briefs and during oral argument 
for enforcement of the ICJ judgment. 
At other times, L was influential in shaping the modalities and 
articulating the rationale for use of force so that it would be accepted by 
the international community.  As Michael Matheson explains: 
I don’t think it’s realistic to think Presidents are often going to 
refrain from the use of force on what they consider to be essential 
security grounds because of the views of the Legal Adviser.  On the 
other hand, I think there are important things that Legal Advisers can 
do with respect to the use of force.  One is to see to it that the 
modalities used are as consistent with international law as possible.  
For example, the actions we took in Nicaragua, which were 
gratuitously in violation of international law need not necessarily 
have been so.  Another aspect is that when the decision is made to 
use force, it’s important what argument is made to justify that 
decision.  There are some ways of justifying which will open up 
entirely new open-ended doctrines.  There are others which are more 
consistent with past practices; the Legal Adviser can have a 
considerable amount of influence on what arguments are made, 
which in turn greatly influences what precedential effect that use of 
force might have.91 
Davis Robinson described the 1983 “rescue mission” in Grenada as 
an example of this: 
In our legal justification, we consciously avoided argument that 
might imply any weakening in the legal restraints that apply to the 
use of force.  For example, we did not claim that we were exercising 
an inherent right of self-defense under the United Nations Charter.  
Furthermore, we did not assert any broad doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention.92 
At the same time, the Legal Advisers recognized that L was not the 
government’s leading voice on all matters of international law.  This 
means that a study of the government’s perception of international law 
that uses L as its focus has value but does not tell the whole story since 
 
 89 Supplement to Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 
10, ch. 17, E-mail Exchange between John Bellinger, Legal Adviser to President George W. 
Bush, and author (2009) (on file with author). 
 90 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
 91 Michael Matheson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 14. 
 92 Davis Robinson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17. 
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legal offices within other government departments and agencies, 
including the Pentagon, the Commerce Department, the CIA, and the 
Department of Justice, have preeminence in certain areas of 
international law within their unique experience and expertise.  As Abe 
Sofaer observed, “The fact of the matter is that American foreign policy 
has shifted from the State Department . . . to other agencies.  As foreign 
policies become more specialized . . . [other agencies] have the lead in 
many international issues.”93 
Where a significant international law-related issue came within the 
special purview of these other legal offices, the State Department 
lawyers were expected to work with their counterparts (and vice versa) 
through a “clearance process” in an attempt to ensure that a single legal 
position would emerge.  Where this proved not to be possible, divergent 
legal opinions would ordinarily be presented to the President and 
Cabinet within the text of a decision memo.  To maximize their legal 
influence, State Department Legal Advisers found that they had to be 
much more than gifted lawyers and administrators; they also had to be 
skillful and sometimes aggressive bureaucrats, unafraid to tackle the 
internecine turf battles that were inherent in the inter-agency process.  
Often the most important battle was simply to ensure that L had a 
proverbial “seat at the table.” 
The Legal Advisers pointed out that the internal clearance 
procedure did not always operate in this prescribed manner, and on a 
handful of notable occasions L was intentionally kept out of the 
decision-making process, even on matters that turned entirely on 
interpretation of international law.  This tended to happen when State 
Department officials from other bureaus or government officials from 
other departments or agencies foresaw that L would likely oppose a 
proposed course of action.  As Davis Robinson put it: “Some policy 
makers will on occasion assume the following attitude: ‘Oh, let’s not 
involve L.  First, they are likely to say no.  Second, they will take 
forever—they are so slow.  And, if you’re not careful, once they get 
involved, they will run away with your store.’”94  The Legal Advisers 
mentioned the following cases in which L was cut out of the decision-
making process: the 1980s mining of Nicaraguan harbors95 and armed 
 
 93 Abe Sofaer, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, 
supra note 10, ch. 14. 
 94 Davis Robinson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.  
 95 Id. ch. 14 (“That was a contrast with the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors where I’m sorry 
to say we knew absolutely nothing in advance. . . .  [W]hen it comes to use of force . . . over the 
years, there’s been a lot [of] skepticism about including the lawyers—for example in planning 
covert operations.  As far as I know, in a covert operation international law still applies, so if 
someone’s going to undertake some secret operation involving the use of force, it’s better to have 
the legal argument in place before undertaking it.”). 
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support for the “contras,”96 the 1990 kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez-
Machain from Mexico,97 and the adoption of policies related to the 
treatment of “unlawful enemy combatants” detained in the aftermath of 
the attacks of September 11, 2001.98 
The same policy-makers that cut L out of the decision-making 
process, however, display no hesitancy in seeking L’s assistance in 
crafting after-the-fact legal justifications for the decisions and actions 
taken.  No matter his own opinion on the matter, the Legal Adviser is 
then asked to become advocate for the U.S. position.99  As Stephen 
Schwebel, a former Deputy Legal Adviser who later served as President 
of the International Court of Justice, once remarked: “The [Legal 
Adviser] is always called in to pick up the pieces even if he was not 
influentially involved in the initial decision . . . .”100  Thus, in relation to 
the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors, former Legal Adviser Davis 
Robinson said:  
As it turned out, all that the lawyers could contribute was assistance 
in after-the-fact containment of a train wreck.  I remember one 
Secretary of State under whom I served stating, “I have only one 
rigid rule and that is, don’t ever let me be blind-sided.”  I can only 
have wished that this sensible rule had applied to L as well.101 
During a roundtable discussion with foreign Legal Advisers, 
former U.K. Legal Adviser Sir Franklin Berman offered a comparative 
perspective on this problem: 
Probably the most notorious incident where the U.K. Legal Adviser 
was deliberately cut out of the loop was the ‘56 Suez invasion.  But I 
would say that the lessons of that experience have generally been 
 
 96 Abe Sofaer, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, 
supra note 10, ch. 7.  
 97 See id. (“The Alvarez-Machain case is another example . . . [of] the strong correlation 
between disastrous policies and failure to consult in advance with the international lawyers.  In 
the Alvarez-Machain case, not only was the Legal Adviser’s office not consulted, but the Justice 
Department didn’t even consult the White House.  They went ahead and seized this doctor from 
Mexico in a secret operation and brought him to the United States, took the case all the way up 
[to] the Supreme Court, and then lost the trial.  It had a negative [e]ffect on our foreign policy, 
and several countries required that we provide assurances that we would not kidnap citizens from 
their territory.”).  
 98 SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 16. 
 99 Abe Sofaer recalled that he “privately recommended that the President adhere to the 
narrower interpretation of the [ABM] treaty” until the Senate consented to a broader 
interpretation that would not prevent the testing and development of President Reagan’s proposed 
Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as Star Wars).  Abe Sofaer, Remarks at Day-Long 
Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 7.  Sofaer’s view was 
firmly conveyed and firmly rejected.  Id.  Sofaer was then left with the “futile” task of articulating 
the legal rationale for unilateral Executive Branch implementation of the new interpretation.  Id.  
 100 Stephen M. Schwebel, Remarks on the Role of the Legal Adviser of the US State 
Department, 2-1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 132, 134 (1991). 
 101 Davis Robinson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17. 
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learned for the future.  It is considered a cardinal sin within the U.K. 
Foreign Office to put up a policy submission that did not clearly 
recite that the Legal Adviser or his staff had been consulted, or 
which did not include an analysis of the legal questions which were 
relevant to the decision.  If the submission did not contain this, then 
any legitimate senior official or minister would send it back for a 
complete analysis to know what the law stated.102 
The former U.S. State Department Legal Advisers concluded that 
the United States would do well to adopt a similar iron-clad procedural 
requirement.  As Davis Robinson summed up:  
The main lesson that I drew from my days in L is that, if the United 
States Government is to realize the full benefit of the potential 
contribution of its international lawyers, the lawyers need to 
participate from the beginning of a take-off in policy and not just in a 
crash landing whenever things go wrong.103 
Interestingly, none of the Legal Advisers said they ever seriously 
considered resigning from office when their legal advice was not 
heeded or when they were cut out of the loop, though all agreed that 
resignation might be necessary in an extreme case.  In particular, the 
Legal Advisers discussed the case of U.K. Deputy Legal Adviser 
Elizabeth Wilmshurst, who resigned when the U.K. government decided 
to disregard her legal memo opining that the proposed 2003 invasion of 
Iraq was not lawful.104  Conrad Harper remarked, “To be an effective 
Legal Adviser or Deputy Legal Adviser, one must recognize that the 
exit door must always be open.  When there is a very important matter 
and the government refuses to follow advice that you consider to be 
essential, you are suppose[d] to resign.”105  In this regard, Roberts Owen 
related the story of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s resignation to 
protest the Iranian hostage rescue mission that was launched over his 
opposition.106 
 
5.     Do the Legal Advisers view international law as helpful or a 
hindrance? 
 
No matter whether a particular Legal Adviser leaned more toward 
constructivist or political realist, they all embraced international law as 
 
 102 SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 15. 
 103 Davis Robinson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.  
 104 For background on Wilmshurst’s resignation, see Paul Eastham, Iraq: Is This the Smoking 
Gun?, DAILY MAIL (London), Mar. 25, 2005, at 6. 
 105 Conrad Harper, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17. 
 106 SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 17.  
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a tool for achieving U.S. foreign policy goals.  For, as Professor Louis 
Henkin has written, “‘[r]ealists’ who do not recognize the uses and the 
force of law are not realistic.”107  At the same time, this author would 
add that constructivists who would approach international law as a 
straight jacket that precludes innovative interpretation are not 
constructive. 
The Legal Advisers shared a number of instances where creative 
interpretation and use of international law furthered U.S. foreign policy 
aims and avoided the necessity of using force.  These include L’s lead 
role in establishing the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal which was part of the 
deal for the release of U.S. hostages, and the Iraqi Compensation 
Commission and Boundary Dispute Commission which were part of the 
cease fire agreement in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.108 
In this regard, David Andrews detailed the role L played in 
negotiating the several international agreements and Security Council 
Resolutions that made it possible to try the two Libyan officials charged 
with blowing up Pan Am 103 before a special Scottish Court sitting in 
The Netherlands.  This creative solution severed a thirty-year cycle of 
violence between the United States and Libya and facilitated the 
transformation of Libya from a terrorist-supporting State to a partner in 
the war against terrorism.109 
Michael Matheson, in turn, recounted L’s pivotal role in the 
creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, the first international war crimes tribunal since 
Nuremberg.110  It was L that came up with the idea of having the 
Security Council create the tribunal under its Chapter VII powers rather 
than seek to negotiate a treaty (as the Europeans had proposed) that 
would take a great deal more time and might yield unpredictable results.  
The Security Council had never before been used to establish a judicial 
body, but L succeeded in convincing the other members of the Council 
that such action was legitimate and would yield a better result than the 
treaty route.111  The launch of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal in 
 
 107 HENKIN, supra note 8, at 337. 
 108 Matheson explained: 
The amounts claimed totaled well over $200 million, and it was clear that the usual 
method by which such international claims problems are resolved (a formal case-by-
case adjudication process in the adversarial mode, like the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal) 
would be wholly inadequate to deal with the problems presented here.  So instead, the 
Legal Adviser’s office proposed and ultimately the Security Council agreed to an 
innovative system, which had a number of new features. 
Michael Matheson, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, 
supra note 10, ch. 9. 
 109 SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 11.  
 110 Id. ch. 9.  
 111 Conrad Harper adds: 
Now there was something masquerading as something old that was in fact 
revolutionary—and the genius of it was that we were able to convince the world that it 
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1993 led to the Security Council’s creation of the Rwanda Tribunal a 
year later and ultimately paved the way to the establishment of a 
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) four years after that. 
 
B.     Just a Matter of Semantics? 
 
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 
‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.’ 
—Lewis Caroll112 
 
If Goldsmith and Posner and other neo-realists and rationalists 
recognize that international legal rules exert influence on State behavior 
(through concern about negative publicity, diminution of reputation, 
reduced international cooperation, and retaliation),113 and that as a 
consequence States usually act in accordance with customary 
international law and treaty law,114 then what difference does it make if 
international law is labeled “binding” law or not?  Why the focus on 
whether or not government officials should perceive a “moral” 
obligation to comply with international law?  In light of Goldsmith and 
Posner’s self-identified “instrumentalist” mind set, another way to put 
this question is: What are they trying to accomplish by seeking to prove 
that international law is not real law?  And, in semiotic terms, who are 
they seeking to influence and why? 
A recent essay in The American Interest by Nicholas Rostow, who 
served as Chief Counsel of the NSC during the administration of 
George H.W. Bush and subsequently as Legal Adviser of the U.S. 
Mission to the United Nations during the administration of George W. 
Bush, points to the answer to this question.  According to Rostow: 
[C]riticism of the United States on international law grounds is 
especially notable because of the very nature of the United States as 
 
was just what everyone had always understood should be the case.  While we were 
operating under Chapter 7, and the Security Council had created the tribunal, 
nonetheless people talked about Nuremberg and Tokyo and the post WWI war crimes 
efforts as if they were the lineal ancestry of the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal—when 
in fact of course this tribunal was something that the world had never seen before.  
Now, having done it once we’ve done it again and it really is old. 
Conrad Harper, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra 
note 10, ch. 14. 
 112 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 
(1871), in THE ANNOTATED ALICE: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 213 (Martin Gardner ed., 2000) 
(emphases omitted). 
 113 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 90.  
 114 Id. at 165. 
SCHARF.31-1 10/1/2009  8:41:58 AM 
76 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:1 
a country: the United States is defined by law.  Its oaths of 
citizenship and office holding are pledges to the Constitution, not to 
a flag, not to a territory, not to the mother- or fatherland, and, of 
course, not to a sovereign.  The law defines who an American is, and  
it binds each of us to every other.  
  That is part of the reason why the United States cannot long 
sustain foreign policies at odds with international law: In the end, 
Americans will not support them.  The American people ask “Is it 
legal?” before they ask any other question about foreign policy 
actions short of self-defense against direct aggression.115 
Rostow’s observation suggests that as long as policy-makers, 
bureaucrats, and the general public believe that compliance with 
international law is important, this belief will have a significant impact 
on State decision-making. 
In his 2007 memoir, The Terror Presidency, Goldsmith identifies 
himself as “part of a group of conservative intellectuals—dubbed ‘new 
sovereigntists’ in Foreign Affairs magazine—who were skeptical about 
the creeping influence of international law on American law.”116  
Goldsmith recounts how when he advised White House Chief Counsel 
Alberto Gonzales that “[t]he President can also ignore the law, and act 
extralegally,” citing “honorable precedents, going back to the founding 
of the nation, of defying legal restrictions in time[s] of crisis,” Gonzales 
looked at him as if he were crazy.117  Goldsmith offers the following 
explanation for the Attorney General’s reaction: 
The post-Watergate hyper-legalization of warfare, and the attendant 
proliferation of criminal investigators, had become so ingrained and 
threatening that the very idea of acting extralegally was simply off 
the table, even in times of crisis.  The President had to do what he 
had to do to protect the country.  And the lawyers had to find some 
way to make what he did legal.118 
Distaining the perceived hypocrisy enshrined in the Bush 
Administration’s approach, in The Limits of International Law, 
Goldsmith and Posner have sought to put the idea of openly defying 
international law back on the table, by convincing policy-makers, 
bureaucrats, and the American public that international law is not real 
 
 115 Nicholas Rostow, Law Abiding: Restoring America’s Global Reputation, AM. INTEREST, 
Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 81, 81. 
 116 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 21.  Goldsmith states: 
My academic objections to this trend were based on the need for democratic control 
over the norms that governed American conduct.  My scholarship argued against the 
judicial activism that gave birth to international human rights lawsuits in U.S. courts.  
It decried developments in “customary international law” that purported to bind the 
United States to international rules to which the nation’s political leaders had not 
consented. 
Id. 
 117 Id. at 80. 
 118 Id. at 81 (emphasis added). 
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law but merely “a special kind of politics”119 that can be ignored 
whenever government officials believe it is in the national interest to do 
so.  Understood in this light, The Limits of International Law is not 
really a descriptive account of how international law actually works, but 
an effort to alter public perceptions about the importance of 
international law in order to expand presidential power in foreign 
relations.120 
Goldsmith and Posner are not, however, merely tilting at 
windmills, and their work is unlikely to be the “Alamo” of the realist 
school, as one commentator colorfully suggested.121  Rather, their 
venture must be viewed in the context of recognition of the power of 
tactical words and phrases to fundamentally alter popular attitudes and 
perceptions.  The leading expert in this area today is Frank Luntz, a 
Republican political consultant, Fox News pundit, and author of The 
Luntz Republican Playbook, a strategy memo that has been widely 
employed by Republican political candidates.122  In 1994, Luntz found 
through focus group research that “death tax” kindled voter resentment 
in a way that the phrases “inheritance tax” and “estate tax” did not.  He 
shared his findings with Republican leaders, who included the new 
formulation in the GOP’s “Contract with America.”  Soon the term 
“death tax” began to appear in news shows and newspaper articles, and 
was even included in the title of the legislation that ultimately repealed 
the estate tax, the “Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000.”  In the years 
since then, Luntz has spearheaded the Republican effort to frame the 
debate on dozens of other salient political issues through the creative 
use of language.  Examples of this include changing the phrases “oil 
drilling” to “energy exploration,” “tax cuts” to “tax relief,” 
“undocumented workers” to “illegal aliens,” “private school vouchers” 
to “parental choice,” “global warming” to “climate change,” “late-term 
abortion” to “partial-birth abortion,” “healthcare reform” to 
“government takeover of healthcare,” and perhaps most relevant to our 
discussion, renaming the effort to suppress terrorism the “Global War 
on Terror,” dubbing “kidnapping” “extraordinary rendition,” referring 
to “detainees” as “unlawful enemy combatants,” and calling “torture” 
“enhanced interrogation.”123 
 
 119 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 202. 
 120 McGuinness, supra note 57, at 421. 
 121 Spiro, supra note 60, at 446. 
 122 An excerpt of the Frank Luntz Republican Playbook, “Appendix: The 14 Words Never to 
Use,” was leaked and posted on the internet at http://www.politicalstrategy.org/archives/ 
001208.php.  
 123 See Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 38, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/17/magazine/17DEMOCRATS.html; see also 
FRANK LUNTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF HEALTHCARE 2009 (2009), available at 
http://wonkroom.thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/frank-luntz-the-language-of-
healthcare-20091.pdf; Evan R. Goldstein, Who Framed George Lakoff?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
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Over the years, Democratic politicians and liberal commentators 
have practiced these word games as well, though less frequently and 
with less success.  They have, for example, altered the moniker “pro-
abortion” to “pro-choice” in the 1970s and re-branded Ronald Reagan’s 
missile defense initiative “Star Wars” in the 1980s.  Luntz’s counterpart 
on the Democratic side is Professor George Lakoff of U.C. Berkely, 
best-selling author of Don’t Think of an Elephant and founder of a 
political consulting firm known as the Rockridge Institute.124  Lakoff 
has convinced the Democratic leadership that Republican success has 
been in part due to skilled use of loaded language, along with constant 
repetition, enabling the phrases to enter the everyday lexicon and 
thereby bias the debate in favor of conservatives.  Following Lakoff’s 
advice, in the 2008 national elections, Democrats began referring to 
themselves as “progressives” instead of “liberals,” labeled the Bush 
Administration’s Iraq strategy “escalation” instead of “surge,” and 
called “deficit spending” “economic stimulus.”125 
In the context of international law and foreign policy, the 
importance of labeling can be clearly demonstrated with respect to the 
development and use of the euphemistic term “ethnic cleansing” as an 
alternative for “genocide.”  Although the Genocide Convention does not 
generally require countries to take action to halt genocide outside their 
borders,126 governments have found that the term “genocide,” with its 
roots in the Holocaust, has a unique power to create often irresistible 
public pressure on a government to act.  Consequently, in order to 
preserve their options or excuse inaction, governments prefer to instead 
employ the term “ethnic cleansing” to describe mass atrocities. 
While the term “ethnic cleansing” is frequently attributed as a 
linguistic creation of Serb leaders in 1992 to describe their policy of 
ridding parts of Bosnia of Muslims, in fact the term was an invention of 
journalists and it was propagated first by the United States and then by 
the United Nations.  In March 1993, the State Department Office of the 
Legal Adviser prepared a memorandum for the Secretary of State, 
opining that the information in the government’s possession was 
sufficient to legally conclude that a one-sided, well-organized campaign 
of genocide was taking place in Bosnia, but Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher nevertheless refused to use the “G-word.”127  When asked 
 
Aug. 15, 2008, at B6, available at http://www.chronicle.com/free/v54/i49/49b00601.htm. 
 124 Bai, supra note 123. 
 125 See id.; Wayne Slater, Democrats Realizing the War That Wins Votes Is One of Words, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 20, 2007, at A3. 
 126 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91 (Feb. 26), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.  
 127 Michael P. Scharf & Colin T. McLaughlin, On Terrorism and Whistleblowing, 38 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 567, 569 (2006-07).  
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while testifying before Congress, “Doesn’t ethnic cleansing qualify as 
genocide?,” Secretary Christopher answered in the negative, insisting 
that “all sides had committed atrocities” and that Bosnia was essentially 
an “ethnic feud” and therefore “somewhat different from the 
Holocaust.”128 
In response, several mid-level State Department officials took the 
extraordinary step of resigning to protest the Secretary of State’s 
intentional obfuscation of the truth about the Bosnian atrocities, whose 
purpose was to allow the Administration to maintain that there was no 
moral or legal imperative for U.S. military intervention in Bosnia.129  
Conrad Harper, the Legal Adviser at the time, recalls:  
In my view they were genocides.  But there were a lot of policy 
concerns about being that blunt, including what obligation we had 
under the Genocide Convention to act—so it was a tap dance.  But I 
never had any doubt in my own mind, and I made it clear that was 
my view.  But the Legal Adviser doesn’t make the ultimate 
decisions, even about characterizing something as an international 
crime.130 
A year later, while 800,000 Tutsis were being massacred by Hutus 
in Rwanda, the U.S. State Department similarly engaged in what 
genocide chronicler Samantha Power later characterized as “a two-
month dance to avoid the [G]-word.”131 A subsequently leaked 
Pentagon discussion paper on the unfolding crisis in Rwanda revealed 
the purpose behind this strategy, warning that a “Genocide finding 
could commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something.’”132  
Consistent with this, in a comprehensive study covering 1990-2005, 
which was published in the European Journal of Public Health, 
researches found that the term “ethnic cleansing” was frequently used 
by government officials and U.N. bodies instead of “genocide” to 
downplay urgency, “leading to inaction in preventing current and future 
 
 128 Id.; see also Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Goal on Bosnia: Keeping War Within Borders, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 19, 1993, at A10. 
 129 The resigning officials included George Kenney, Deputy head of the Bosnia Desk; 
Marshall Harris, head of the Bosnia Desk; Jon Western of the Intelligence and Research Bureau; 
and Steven Walker, the head of the Croatian Desk.  See Norman Kempster, 4th U.S. Aide Quits 
over Balkan Policy, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 24, 1993, at 10.  One of the officials who resigned, 
Marshall Harris, told the press, “It’s genocide and the [S]ecretary of [S]tate won’t identify it as 
such.  That’s where we get beyond the political to the moral.”  Daniel Williams, A Third State 
Dept. Official Resigns over Balkan Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1993, at A1. 
 130 Conrad Harper, Remarks at Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 10, ch. 10 
 131 SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 359 
(Perennial 2003). 
 132 Joanne Mariner, Talking About Darfur: Is Genocide Just a Word?, COUNTERPUNCH, Sept. 
15, 2004 (alteration in original), available at http://www.counterpunch.org/mariner09152004 
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genocides.”133  Concluding that “[t]he term ‘ethnic cleansing’ corrupts 
observation, interpretation, ethical judgment and decision-making,” the 
authors of the study argue that the Public Health community “should 
lead the way in expunging the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ from official 
use.” 134 
It turned out that the Pentagon was right to be concerned about the 
power of the “G-word,” as the George W. Bush Administration learned 
the hard way ten years after the crisis in Rwanda.  In June 2004, the 
United States Congress and the State Department announced their 
determination that the atrocities in Darfur, Sudan amounted to 
genocide.135  A year later, when France and the United Kingdom 
submitted a Security Council resolution to authorize the ICC to exercise 
jurisdiction over the Darfur situation, the Bush Administration realized 
that having labeled the atrocities genocide it could not get away with 
voting against the resolution despite its opposition to the ICC.136  As a 
result, subsequent to abstaining on the resolution, the Bush 
Administration found that it could no longer assert that the ICC was an 
illegitimate and inherently unfair institution, and because the power of 
the Security Council was now on the line, the Administration had to 
support efforts to compel the surrender of indicted Sudanese officials to 
the ICC. 
Echoing the underlying premise of semiotic theory, both Luntz and 
Lakoff argue that the most important resource a politician or policy-
maker has is the way in which people understand the world and 
therefore interpret the message.  As Luntz puts it, “It’s not what you 
say, it’s what people hear.”137  Thus, they advocate “framing”—that is, 
choosing the language to define a debate, which is exactly what Posner 
and Goldsmith have sought to accomplish through The Limits of 
International Law.  At the same time that Goldsmith and Posner decline 
to acknowledge the ways international law may influence legal 
consciousness, by seeking to convince the public that it is no more 
“illegal” to contravene international law than it would be to disregard a 
non-binding letter of intent,138 “they themselves are nevertheless 
attempting to affect legal consciousness in the United States.”139 
George Orwell discussed the power of language to alter societal 
 
 133 Rony Blum et al., ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ Bleaches the Atrocities of Genocide, 18 EUR. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 204, 204 (2008). 
 134 Id.  
 135 Mahmood Mamdani, The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency, LONDON 
REV. BOOKS, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n05/mamd01_%20html.  
 136 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to 
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
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 138 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 90; Posner, supra note 4, at 1901.  
 139 Berman, supra note 65, at 1306. 
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conceptions in his famous 1946 essay, Politics and the English 
Language,140 and then brought the theory to life in his fictional 
masterpiece Nineteen Eighty-Four.141 Particularly prophetic was 
Nineteen Eighty-Four’s portrayal of propaganda by labeling and 
through re-definition of words.  Thus, the “Ministry of Peace” in the 
novel actually deals with war, the “Ministry of Love” is in charge of 
torturing people, and the mandate of the “Ministry of Truth” is to revise 
historical records to match the government’s version of the past and to 
develop “Newspeak,” the government’s minimalist artificial language 
meant to ideologically align thought and action with the aims of the 
government.  What Goldsmith and Posner seek to accomplish through 
their book is not that different from what Orwell’s fictional government 
sought through the use of the Newspeak concept of “blackwhite.”  
Orwell described blackwhite as the “loyal willingness to say that black 
is white when Party discipline demands this. . . .  [I]t means also the 
ability to believe that black is white, and more, to know that black is 
white, and to forget that one has ever believed the contrary.”142 
Most political scientists who seek to discount the influence of 
international law tend to avoid even using the term “international law” 
or “international obligation,” instead preferring to speak of international 
“principles,” “norms,” “standards,” “precepts,” “rules,” and 
“procedures.”143  Goldsmith and Posner, in contrast, seek to reverse the 
meaning of the term altogether.  Thus, under the Goldsmith/Posner 
paradigm, whenever one thinks of “binding” international legal 
obligations, one is expected to understand the term to actually mean 
“non-binding”; whenever one thinks of international “law,” one is 
expected to understand the term to really mean international “politics.” 
 
C.     A Modern Case Study: The Torture Memos and International Law 
 
In light of subsequent revelations, it is surprising that Goldsmith 
and Posner did not include the case study of the treatment of detainees 
in the war on terror in their book, especially since Goldsmith gives a 
first-hand account of the decision-making that led to the promulgation 
of the Torture Memos in his later book, The Terror Presidency.144  
Because it reflects the contemporary state of the international 
community and current U.S. perceptions about the role of international 
 
 140 4 GEORGE ORWELL, Politics and the English Language (1946), reprinted in THE 
COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 127 (Sonia Orwell & Ian 
Angus eds., David R. Godine 2000).  
 141 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
 142 GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 218 (Plume 2003) (1949). 
 143 See Koh, supra note 17, at 2625. 
 144 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 142, 172.  
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law, and because there is a concrete paper trail of the legal positions of 
the relevant actors, the story of the Torture Memos is in many ways a 
better vehicle for examining the binding nature of international law than 
the older historic anecdotes that Goldsmith and Posner rely on in their 
book.  The facts set forth below reflect the unanimous findings of a 
bipartisan panel of twenty-five Senators, following extensive hearings 
into the matter in the summer and fall of 2008.145  In some cases, these 
findings are supplemented by interviews of the principal players 
conducted by Professor Philippe Sands,146 the personal recollections of 
Jack Goldsmith147 and John Yoo,148 and the commentary of two of the 
Legal Advisers interviewed for this project—William Taft and John 
Bellinger. 
The story begins soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.  Rather than vet questions 
related to the interpretation of international law to the legal departments 
of all the relevant agencies, much of the legal work related to the war on 
terrorism was done by a self-styled “war council,” composed of White 
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the Vice President’s Counsel David 
Addington, the Pentagon’s Chief Counsel Jim Haynes, and the Deputy 
head of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), 
John Yoo, who Goldsmith identifies as a fellow “new sovereigntist.”149  
David Addington was reportedly the dominant force among the group, 
and one high-level Bush Administration insider recounted that “if you 
favored international law, you were in danger of being called ‘soft on 
terrorism’ by Addington.”150  Notably absent from the group were the 
State Department Legal Adviser, William Taft, and NSC Chief Counsel, 
John Bellinger (who would three years later replace Taft as State 
Department Legal Adviser).  Since OLC had the power to issue 
opinions that were binding throughout the executive branch, in 
coordination with the war council, John Yoo wrote opinion after 
opinion approving every aspect of the Bush Administration’s aggressive 
antiterrorism efforts, giving counter-terrorism officials and personnel 
“the comfort of knowing that they could not easily be prosecuted later 
for the approved actions.”151 
 
 145 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE INQUIRY 
INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY (Dec. 11, 2008), available at 
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/Detainees.121108.pdf. The full 263-page 
report, which was subsequently de-classified and released in May 2009, is available at 
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2009/SASC.DetaineeReport.042209.pdf.  
 146 PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM (2008). 
 147 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51.  
 148 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
(2006). 
 149 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 21-22.  
 150 SANDS, supra note 146, at 213. 
 151 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 23. 
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John Yoo believed “[t]he candid approach would be to admit that 
our old laws and policies did not address this new enemy [al Qaeda].”152  
On January 9, 2002, Yoo authored a key memorandum, providing legal 
arguments to support administration officials’ assertions that the 
Geneva Conventions did not apply to detainees from the war in 
Afghanistan.  On January 25, 2002, Gonzales sent a memo (ghost-
written by Addington)153 to President Bush, which opined that the 
advice in the January 9th OLC memorandum was sound and that the 
President should declare the Taliban and al Qaeda outside the coverage 
of the Geneva Conventions.  This, Gonzales pointed out, would keep 
American interrogators from being exposed to the War Crimes Act, a 
1996 law that makes it a federal crime to cause a grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions or a violation of Common Article 3.154  Gonzales’s 
memo described the war against terrorism as “a new kind of war” and a 
“new paradigm” that showed “Geneva’s strict limitations on 
questioning of enemy prisoners” to be “obsolete” and even “quaint.”155 
When he learned of the Gonzales memorandum, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell quickly prepared a memorandum for the White House, 
stating that the advantages of applying the Geneva Conventions to the 
Afghan detainees far outweighed those of their rejection.156  Powell said 
that declaring the conventions inapplicable would “reverse over a 
century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the Geneva 
[C]onventions and undermine the protections of the law of war for our 
troops.”157  He added that it would “undermine public support among 
critical allies.”158  An accompanying memorandum prepared by State 
Department Legal Adviser William Taft, opined that it is important for 
the United States to confirm “that even in a new sort of conflict the 
United States bases its conduct on its international treaty obligations 
and the rule of law, not just on its policy preferences.”159  Despite 
Powell and Taft’s contrary advice, on February 7, the President signed a 
memorandum stating that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the 
conflict and that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees were not entitled to 
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prisoner of war status or the protections afforded by the Third Geneva 
Convention.  Although the President’s order stated that as “a matter of 
policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees 
humanely,” the decision to replace compliance with the Geneva 
Conventions with a policy subject to discretionary interpretation, set the 
stage for the serious abuses that were to follow.160 
A few months later, on August 1, 2002, John Yoo issued two OLC 
memos, signed by his boss, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee.  The 
first, addressed to Gonzales, opined that interrogators could inflict pain 
and suffering on detainees up to the level caused by “organ failure” 
without violating the domestic and international prohibitions on torture 
and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment.161  Yoo derived his 
definition of torture from a completely unrelated statute that authorized 
benefits for emergency health conditions, using the phrase “severe pain” 
as a possible indicator of an emergency condition that might cause 
serious harm if not immediately treated.162  Yoo’s memo also advised 
that, under the doctrine of “necessity,” the President could supersede 
national and international laws prohibiting torture.  The second OLC 
memo, which responded to a request from the CIA, addressed the 
legality of specific interrogation tactics, including “waterboarding.”163 
Two months later, on October 11, 2002, after meeting with 
Gonzales, Addington, and Haynes in Cuba,164 the Commander of 
Guantanamo Bay, Major General Michael Dunlavey, sent a memo to 
the Pentagon requesting authority to use aggressive interrogation 
techniques that were originally designed to simulate abusive tactics used 
by our enemies against our own soldiers, including tactics used by the 
Communist Chinese to elicit false confessions from U.S. military 
personnel.  These included “stress positions,” “exploitation of detainee 
fears,” “removal of clothing,” “hooding,” “deprivation of light and 
sound,” “deprivation of sleep,” and “waterboarding.”165  Dunlavey’s 
memo stated that the existing techniques permitted by the Army Field 
Manual 34-52 had been exhausted, and that some detainees (in 
particular Mohammed al-Qahtani, a Saudi Arabian believed to be the 
twentieth 9/11 hijacker) had more information that was vital to U.S. 
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national security.166 
Given a four-day deadline, and without access to international law 
books or databases, Guantanamo’s Staff Judge Advocate Lt. Col. Diane 
Beaver wrote an analysis justifying the legality of the techniques.  Lt. 
Col. Beaver expected that a broader legal review conducted at more 
senior levels would follow her own.167  The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers solicited the views of the several 
branches of the military.  All stated their opposition.  The Air Force 
cited “serious concerns regarding the legality of many of the proposed 
techniques.”168  The Chief of the Army’s International and Operational 
Law Division wrote that the techniques “cross[] the line of ‘humane’ 
treatment,” would “likely be considered maltreatment” under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, and “may violate the torture 
statute.”169  The Marine Corps stated that the requested techniques 
“arguably violate federal law, and would expose our service members to 
possible prosecution.”170 
During the meeting of the Legal Advisers, William Taft provided 
the following account of the role his Office played during this period: 
In the months following the President’s decision, the Legal Adviser’s 
Office drafted a lengthy memorandum, which concluded that 
because our policy was to treat the al Qaeda and Taliban detainees 
consistent with the requirements of the Geneva Conventions, the 
question of whether they were entitled to this as a matter of law was 
moot. (This draft memorandum was made public by the 
Administration in January of 2005.)  The draft also expressed the 
view that customary international law required that the detainees in 
any event be treated humanely and had certain of the rights set out in 
the Conventions.  We thought that because it was our policy to treat 
the detainees consistent with the Conventions, that this was being 
done.  It developed, however, that at the same time we were working 
on our memorandum and subsequently the Department of Justice 
lawyers were working separately with the lawyers at the Department 
of Defense to authorize certain departures from the Conventions’ 
terms in the treatment of the detainees, particularly with regard to 
methods of interrogation.  I and my staff were not invited to review 
this work and we were, indeed, unaware that it was being done. . . . 
  It was highly regrettable that the Legal Adviser’s Office was not 
involved in the legal work following the decisions in February 2002.  
I think that we were excluded because it was suspected, in light of 
some of the positions we had taken, that we would not agree with 
some of the conclusions other lawyers in the Administration 
 
 166 SANDS, supra note 146, at 37. 
 167 Id. at 65. 
 168 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xviii. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
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expected to reach and that we might leak information about the work 
to the press.  It was somewhat ironic that when the fact of the work 
subsequently did become known, it was clear that we at least were 
not responsible for this because we had been excluded.  I am 
convinced, however, that if we had been involved and our views 
considered, several conclusions that were not consistent with our 
treaty obligations under the Convention [A]gainst Torture (CAT) and 
our obligations under customary international law would not have 
been reached.  Later, in 2004, when we worked with the Department 
of Justice on the revision of the memorandum on the CAT that had 
been withdrawn earlier in the year, we were able to reach agreement 
on a very respectable opinion.171 
Having cut out the State Department Office of Legal Adviser, and 
ignoring the serious concerns raised by the senior lawyers of the 
military services, on November 27, 2002, Jim Haynes, the Pentagon’s 
Chief lawyer, and a member of the so-called “war cabinet” who had 
been best man at David Addington’s wedding,172 sent a one-page memo 
to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, recommending that he approve the 
techniques requested by Guantanamo Bay.  A few days later, on 
December 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld signed Haynes’ 
recommendation, adding a handwritten note that referred to limits 
proposed in the memo on the use of stress positions: “I stand for 8-10 
hours a day.  Why is standing limited to 4 hours?”173  By December 30, 
2002, the interrogators at Guantanamo Bay were employing the 
extraordinary interrogation techniques (including hooding, removal of 
clothing, stress positions, twenty-hour interrogations, and use of dogs) 
on Mohammed al-Qahtani and several other detainees.174 
A month later, these same techniques were being used at the U.S. 
detention center at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, and after the March 
2003 invasion of Iraq they migrated to the Abu Ghraib detention 
facility.175  In his “insider’s account of the war on terror,” War by Other 
Means, John Yoo dismisses the migration theory as “an exercise in 
hyperbole and partisan smear.”176 According to the 2008 Senate 
bipartisan committee report, however: 
The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply 
the result of a few soldiers acting on their own.  Interrogation 
techniques such as stripping detainees of their clothes, placing them 
in stress positions, and using military working dogs to intimidate 
 
 171 Supplement to Day-Long Conference, supra note 73, in SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 
10, ch. 12, E-mail Exchange between William Taft, Legal Adviser to President George W. Bush, 
and author (2006) (on file with author).  
 172 SANDS, supra note 146, at 95. 
 173 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xix. 
 174 Id. at xx-xxii. 
 175 Id. at xxii-xxiii. 
 176 YOO, supra note 148, at 168.  
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them appeared in Iraq only after they had been approved for use in 
Afghanistan and at [Guantanamo Bay].177 
Between mid-December 2002 and mid-January 2003, Navy 
General Counsel Alberto Mora spoke with Haynes three times to 
express his concerns about the interrogation techniques at Guantanamo 
Bay, opining that they constituted “at a minimum, cruel and inhumane 
treatment” that could rise to the level of torture, and “probably will 
cause significant harm to our national legal, political, military and 
diplomatic interests.”178  He prepared a memo to that effect, which he 
threatened to sign unless he heard definitively that the use of the 
techniques had been suspended.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld signed 
a memo rescinding authority for the techniques on January 15, 2003, 
though word of the suspension apparently never got to Afghanistan or 
Iraq.  That same day, Rumsfeld directed the establishment of a 
“Working Group” to review the interrogation techniques, and requested 
another legal opinion from OLC in light of the objections that had been 
raised. 
On March 14, 2003, John Yoo provided an OLC memorandum that 
repeated much of what the first Bybee memo had said six months earlier 
about the definition of torture.  In addition, it stated that interrogators 
could not be prosecuted by the Justice Department for using 
interrogation methods that would otherwise violate the law.  This part of 
the opinion can be reduced to the core proposition that, as Richard 
Nixon intimated in relation to Watergate, “if the president does it, then 
that means it’s legal.”179  The Secretary of Defense rejected the legal 
advice of the military services in favor of that provided by Yoo, and on 
April 16, 2003, authorized the use of twenty-four specific interrogation 
techniques for use at Guantanamo Bay.  In addition, the Secretary’s 
memo stated: “If, in your view, you require additional interrogation 
techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, via the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the 
proposed technique, recommended safeguards, and the rationale for 
applying it with an identified detainee.”180  Rumsfeld subsequently 
approved specific requests for hooding, sensory deprivation, and “sleep 
adjustment.”181 
In his memoir, Goldsmith describes the role he played as head of 
OLC from October 2003 to June 2004 in withdrawing the controversial 
August 1, 2002 and March 14, 2003 OLC opinions on what constitutes 
 
 177 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xxiv.  
 178 SANDS, supra note 146, at 140. 
 179 Cf. Horton, supra note 43 (using the Guantanamo habeas context to examine the Bush 
Administration’s departure from well-settled principles of detainees’ rights to counsel and 
arguing that such departure amounts to “war on the rule of law itself”).  
 180 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xxii. 
 181 Id. 
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prohibited acts of torture, and whether the federal torture statute would 
apply to military interrogations of “unlawful enemy combatants.”182  
When his memoir was published in 2007, Goldsmith was anointed as a 
hero by the media for rescinding these Torture Memos and resigning 
from OLC rather than compromise his principles—actions which 
Newsweek called “a quietly dramatic profile in courage.”183 
Paradoxically, Goldsmith acknowledges that he did not rescind 
Yoo’s Torture Memos because he thought they had reached the wrong 
conclusions, but rather because he thought the memos “rested on 
cursory and one-sided legal arguments” and were “legally flawed, 
tendentious in substance and tone, and overbroad and thus largely 
unnecessary.”184  Indeed, Goldsmith confirms that he believed 
extraordinary interrogation techniques can be legally justified in 
situations “in which the President believed that exceeding the law was 
necessary in an emergency, leaving the torture law intact in the vast 
majority of instances.”185  Notably, the 2004 OLC memo that replaced 
Yoo’s 2002 work contained a footnote saying that “all interrogation 
methods that earlier opinions had found legal were still legal.”186  Yoo 
has asserted that Goldsmith’s withdrawal of Yoo’s 2002 opinion was 
merely “for appearances’ sake” to divert public criticism in the 
immediate aftermath of the Abu Ghraib controversy.  “In the real world 
of interrogation policy nothing had changed.”187 
More significantly, Goldsmith glosses over the tale of his own 
“Torture Memo,” a March 19, 2004 OLC memorandum that he 
authored and which has been described as a “roadmap to the 
outsourcing of torture and other forms of abuse” to Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria.188  He also tries to downplay 
 
 182 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 141-76.  The Bybee-Yoo memos opined that the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to “unlawful combatants,” that obligations under human rights treaties 
do not apply to conduct outside of the territory of the United States, and that the Torture 
Convention prohibited only the most extreme forms of intentionally inflicted harm—namely 
those causing the most severe kind of physical pain tantamount to death or organ failure or 
psychological forms of pressure that cause permanent or prolonged mental harm—and that this 
narrow ban applies only when interrogators specifically intend such harms but not when they are 
seeking information to defend the nation from harm.  The memos likely led to the use of 
waterboarding and other notorious abuses at Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay. 
 183 Daniel Klaidman, Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 
2006, at 34, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/57101.  
 184 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 151. 
 185 Id. at 148. 
 186 YOO, supra note 148, at 183 (emphasis removed).  
 187 Id. 
 188 Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 213 (2006).  The 
Goldsmith memo opined that it was legal for the U.S. to seize individuals from Iraq or other 
territory over which it exercises de facto control and transfer them for purposes of interrogation in 
other countries.  A week after it was circulated, news broke of the use of “black sites” and a 
covert CIA-chartered airline which moved CIA detainees from one secret facility to another.  Id. 
at 210-11. 
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the fact that when Yoo wrote the OLC opinion of August 1, 2002 (the 
memorandum that Goldsmith rescinded), Yoo also issued a second, 
eighteen-page memorandum to the CIA on the same day, which 
concluded that specific, proposed techniques including waterboarding 
were compatible with international law.189   Goldsmith left the memo to 
the CIA in place, with the effect of providing CIA personnel (who 
ended up waterboarding several detainees hundreds of times) with what 
Goldsmith describes as a “golden shield”190 that would protect them 
against prosecutions under the Federal War Crimes Act (implementing 
U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions) and the Federal Anti-
Torture Act (implementing U.S. obligations under the Torture 
Convention).191 
In December 2008 a bipartisan panel of twenty-five Senators 
unanimously concluded that former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and several former high-level Whitehouse, Pentagon, and 
Justice Department lawyers bear direct responsibility for serious human 
rights abuses at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere.192  The 
report concludes that “senior officials in the United States government 
solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the 
law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use 
against detainees.”193   Specifically with respect to the responsibility of 
the government lawyers, the report states: “Those OLC opinions 
distorted the meaning and intent of anti-torture laws, rationalized the 
abuse of detainees in U.S. custody and influenced Department of 
Defense determinations as to what interrogation techniques were legal 
 
 189 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 155-56.  In explaining why he did not rescind the August 1, 
2002 Yoo-Bybee memo to the CIA, Goldsmith writes: 
And in contrast to my sense of the Defense Department techniques [which Goldsmith 
believed would be legally justified under proper legal analysis], I wasn’t as confident 
that the CIA techniques [including waterboarding] could be approved under a proper 
legal analysis.  I didn’t affirmatively believe they were illegal either, or else I would 
have stopped them.  I just didn’t yet know.  And I wouldn’t know until we had figured 
out the proper interpretation of the torture statute, and whether the CIA techniques 
were consistent with that proper legal analysis.   
Id.  The August 1, 2002 Yoo-Bybee memo to the CIA was publicly released by the Obama 
Administration on April 19, 2009, and is available at http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/ 
aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf.  A 2005 OLC Memo, which was released on the same day, 
documents that certain Guantanamo detainees were subjected to waterboarding as many as 183 
times.  See Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 
2009, at A1. 
 190 GOLDSMITH, supra note 51, at 144. 
 191 Lawrence Velvel, The Mainstream Media Anoints Jack Goldsmith a Hero, OPEDNEWS, 
Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.opednews.com/articles/1/opedne_lawrence_071012_the_mainstream 
_media.htm. 
 192 Joby Warrick & Karen DeYoung, Report on Detainee Abuse Blames Top Bush Officials, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2008, at A1. 
 193 U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVS. COMM., supra note 145, at xii.  
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for use during interrogations conducted by U.S. military personnel.”194 
Citing the Nuremberg-era Alstoetter case, Jose Alverez, a 
Columbia Law School professor who had served as an Attorney-
Adviser in L and later as President of the American Society of 
International Law, concluded: “[W]hen government lawyers torture the 
rule of law as gravely as [Yoo, Addington, Haynes, and Goldsmith] 
have done here, international as well as national crimes may have been 
committed, including by the lawyers themselves.”195  “Men of law,” the 
prosecutor of the Alstoetter case told the Nuremberg judges in 1946, 
“can no more escape . . . responsibility by virtue of their judicial robes 
than the general by his uniform.”196  The analogy here is not to the scale 
of the atrocities, but rather to the theory of liability. Consistent with this, 
human rights and civil rights organizations have called for domestic 
prosecution of these individuals in the United States under federal 
statutes that criminalize torture and war crimes,197 and some of the 
victims have lodged civil suits against them in federal court.198  At the 
same time, criminal complaints against these individuals have been filed 
in Spain, Germany, France, Argentina, and Sweden under “universal 
jurisdiction” statutes enabling them to prosecute anyone responsible for 
torture that is present in their territory.199 
Meanwhile, in 2004, 2006, and 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court 
issued a trio of opinions on the detainee issue that began to swing the 
pendulum back in favor of international law and away from unfettered 
Presidential power in the war on terror.  In 2004, the Court decided the 
 
 194 Id. at xxvii.  
 195 Alvarez, supra note 188, at 223.  According to Professor Alvarez’s critique, the authors of 
the OLC Memos misconstrued various U.S. treaty obligations prohibiting torture or ignored them 
altogether; they ignored the plain meaning of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; they 
turned the Convention Against Torture into the convention for certain kinds of torture when it 
came to actions outside the United States; and they selectively chose non-U.S. judicial authorities 
to reflect conclusions concerning the severity of pain needed to constitute torture and dismissed 
customary law in a way that was cavalier and reckless. 
 196 SANDS, supra note 146, at 26 (alteration in original). 
 197 Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Asks Justice Department to Appoint 
Independent Prosecutor to Investigate Torture (Mar. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/39060prs20090318.html?s_src=RSS (includes text of letter 
to Attorney General Eric Holder from ACLU Executive Director Anthony Romero). 
 198 Jose Padilla, the first American citizen to be designated an “unlawful enemy combatant,” 
represented by the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School, has filed a 
suit against John Yoo for authoring the Torture Memos.  See John Schwartz, Judge Allows Civil 
Lawsuit over Claims of Torture, N. Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/us/politics/14yoo.html.   
 199 The Center for Constitutional Rights named Rumsfeld, Bybee, Yoo, Goldsmith, and other 
former government lawyers in a complaint it filed in Karlsruhe, Germany.  Sherwood Ross, Many 
High Bush Officials Violated Anti-Torture Laws, AM. CHRON., Jan. 13, 2009, available at 
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/printfriendly/87739.  Similar criminal complaints 
have also been filed against Rumsfeld and others in Argentina, France, Sweden, and most 
recently in Spain.  See Jane Mayer, The Bush Six, NEW YORKER, Apr. 13, 2009, at 23, available 
at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/2009/04/13/090413ta_talk_mayer.  
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case of Rasul v. Bush, rejecting by a 6-to-3 majority the President’s 
contention that Guantanamo Bay was outside of the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts, and ruling that detainees there must be provided access to legal 
assistance and given judicial review of the legality of their detention.200  
The Bush Administration purported to implement the Rasul decision by 
establishing a Combatant Status Review Tribunal at Guantanamo Bay to 
determine on a case-by-case basis the status of the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees.201  The Combat Status Review Tribunal process did not, 
however, provide the detainee’s assistance of counsel or any means to 
find or present evidence to challenge the Government’s case.  A few 
months later, when Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005 (popularly known as the McCain Amendment),202 which 
prohibited inhumane treatment of detainees, including those at 
Guantanamo Bay, President Bush issued a signing statement in which 
he asserted his Constitutional authority to depart from the law when 
warranted by interests of national security.203 
Next, in the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court 
held by a 5-3 majority that the military tribunals established by 
Executive Order to prosecute accused al Qaeda terrorists were unlawful 
because their procedures “violate both the [Uniform Code of Military 
Justice] and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.”204  The Supreme 
Court confirmed that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
applied to all Guantanamo detainees, whether they were Taliban or al-
Qaeda.  “Common Article 3,” wrote the Court, “affords some minimal 
protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to 
individuals who are involved in a conflict in the territory of a 
signatory.”  The Court reached this conclusion by looking at the official 
commentaries to the Geneva Convention, which confirmed its wide 
scope.  The Court invoked the U.S. Army’s Law of War Handbook, 
which described Common Article 3 as “a minimum yardstick of 
protection in all conflicts, not just internal armed conflicts.”205  The 
 
 200 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 201 Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707 
review.pdf.  
 202 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.  To avoid the 
President’s threatened veto, the detainee treatment legislation was revised before enactment to 
exempt the CIA from its requirements and to stipulate that detainees do not have a right to 
challenge their detention in a U.S. court. 
 203 Press Release, President George W. Bush, President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863 
(Dec. 30, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/ 
2005/12/20051230-8.html.  John Yoo has explained the significance of the signing statement in 
the following terms: “McCain’s amendment did not explicitly prohibit necessity or self-defense 
as common law defenses.  Thus, under the law, these defenses will continue to exist, as they did 
in the earlier 1994 anti-torture law.”  YOO, supra note 148, at 200. 
 204 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 205 Id. at 631 n.63. 
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Court also relied on decisions of the International Court of Justice and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
Shortly thereafter, at the urging of President Bush, the Republican-
controlled Congress responded by enacting the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, which provided a legislative basis for Military 
Commissions to try unlawful enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay 
and stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear suits by enemy 
combatants relating to any aspect of their transfer, detention, treatment, 
trial, or conditions of confinement.206  Two years later, in the case of 
Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court declared parts of the Military 
Commissions Act unconstitutional, determined that the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals were “inadequate,” and ruled that the 270 
foreign detainees held for years at Guantanamo Bay have the right to 
appeal to U.S. civilian courts to challenge their indefinite imprisonment 
without charges.207  Guantanamo was designed as a law-free zone, a 
place where the government could subject detainees to indefinite 
incarceration and harsh interrogation techniques without having to 
worry about the legality of such action.  The Boumediene decision 
undercut a core rationale for keeping the detention facility off American 
soil. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, 
acknowledged the terrorism threat the U.S. faces, but he declared: “The 
laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in 
extraordinary times.”208 
Over and over again, the Bush Administration had asserted “we 
don’t do torture.”  That pretense was definitively put to rest on January 
14, 2009, when Susan Crawford, the Bush Administration-appointed 
Convening Authority of the U.S. Military Commissions and a former 
Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 
announced the dropping of charges against Mohamed al-Qahtani, the 
detainee for whom the enhanced interrogation policy was originally 
designed. Without equivocation, Crawford declared, “We tortured 
[Mohammed al-]Qahtani.  His treatment met the legal definition of 
torture.  And that’s why I did not refer the case [for prosecution].”209 
A week later, on January 20, 2009, Barack Obama was sworn in as 
the 44th President of the United States. Just two days into his 
presidency, on January 22, 2009, President Obama signed Executive 
Orders requiring the closure of the Guantanamo Bay facility within 
twelve months,210 the dismantling of the CIA’s network of secret prisons 
 
 206 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3930, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).   
 207 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 208 Id. at 2277. 
 209 Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1 
(first alteration in original). 
 210 Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and 
Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009), 
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around the globe, and prohibiting the CIA from using coercive 
interrogation methods that deviate from the requirements of the Army 
Field Manual.211  The Executive Order on Interrogations specifically 
prohibits U.S. government personnel or agents from relying on the OLC 
Memos in interpreting federal criminal laws, the Convention against 
Torture, or the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.  This changing of the guard is not the end of the story—
for closing down Guantanamo will present significant challenges to the 
new Administration—but it is the beginning of the end. 
 
D.     Lessons from this Modern Case Study 
 
What does this case study tell us about the nature of international 
law?  First, if one were to have taken what could be called a “semiotic 
snapshot” of the detainee story when the Torture Memos first leaked out 
in 2004, the perception of the United States’ commitment to comply 
with international law would be very different than the perception 
reflected by the legislative, judicial, and executive branch actions in 
2008-09. 
Second, the case study demonstrates that to understand State 
interests and behavior, the State must be disaggregated into its 
components, and sometimes those components must be further 
disaggregated.  Normally, the President would receive legal advice from 
top agency lawyers throughout the government, often with conflicting 
interpretations of international law.  L would ordinarily be among the 
entities advocating most forcefully for compliance with international 
law.  In this case, however, the normal process of inclusive clearance 
was for a short time circumvented by a like-minded cabal of aggressive 
lawyers calling themselves the “war cabinet,” whose influence initially 
masked the considerable inter- and intra-departmental disagreement and 
dominated detainee policy. 212 
Eventually, both Congress and the Supreme Court inserted 
 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ClosureOfGuantanamoDetention 
Facilities/.  
 211 Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations/.  
 212 John Yoo has been quite open in explaining why the “war cabinet” cut L out of the 
decision-making process concerning treatment of detainees: “The State Department and OLC 
often disagreed about international law.  State believed that international law had a binding effect 
on the President, indeed on the United States, both internationally and domestically,” whereas 
Yoo did not hold to that view.  YOO, supra note 148, at 33.  Rather than prove that international 
law was not relevant, the intentional circumvention of L indicates that Yoo and his fellow “war 
cabinet” members believed that if the top policy-makers were made aware of L’s views about the 
applicable international legal constraints, they would be much less likely to approve the 
extraordinary interrogation tactics advocated by the “war cabinet.” 
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themselves into the question, and thereby forced the President to alter 
his policies in order to bring them into accord with their view of the 
requirements of the Torture Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and 
customary international law.  As former State Department Legal 
Adviser John Bellinger recounts, the government legal offices 
(including L) that had been frozen out of the initial legal and policy 
decisions ended up playing an influential role in formulating the new 
interpretations and policies: 
  When I moved to the State Department with Secretary Rice in 
2005, first as Senior Adviser and ultimately as Legal Adviser, I was 
deeply concerned by international (and domestic) perceptions that 
the Bush Administration not only did not believe in international law 
but was actively hostile towards it. . . .   
  . . . . 
  In the Bush Administration’s second term, L lawyers . . . led the 
efforts inside the Administration to clarify and adopt a more robust 
legal framework for the detention, treatment, and prosecution of 
captured terrorists. . . .   
  . . . . 
  L was instrumental in helping Secretary Rice persuade the rest of 
the Administration to move high-level al Qaeda detainees held by the 
Central Intelligence Agency to Guantanamo in September, 2006, so 
that they could be prosecuted for their offenses, given access to 
counsel and the [International Committee of the Red Cross], and no 
longer held in undisclosed locations.  L attorneys also tried hard to 
ensure that the CIA’s interrogation program, and the President’s 
Executive Order applicable to it, were consistent with the Detainee 
Treatment Act in 2005 and the Hamdan decision in 2006, which 
concluded that Common Article 3 applied to the treatment of al 
Qaeda detainees.213 
Third, consistent with institutionalist and constructivist models, the 
positions of the State Department Legal Adviser and his counterparts in 
the various branches of the armed services demonstrated that important 
bureaucratic players perceived the Torture Convention, Geneva 
Conventions, and customary international law as applicable and 
binding.  Like the State Department Office of the Legal Adviser, the 
legal offices of the various services were staffed by careerists who had 
internalized and absorbed a strong belief in the constraints and value of 
international law.214  George W. Bush’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Richard Myers, explained the nature of this culture of 
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compliance in the following terms: “We train our people to obey the 
Geneva Conventions, it’s not even a matter of whether it is 
reciprocated—it’s a matter of who we are.”215  Their views were 
reinforced by the positions taken by foreign bodies and international 
organizations.  In particular, the U.N. Secretary-General, the U.N. 
Special Rapporteurs on Torture and Arbitrary Detention, the United 
Kingdom House of Commons, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights all opined 
that the United States’ treatment of detainees was inconsistent with the 
requirements of international law.216 
These same bureaucratic players repeatedly warned about 
reciprocity costs and the prospects of prosecution for violating the 
international prohibition against torture. Concern about bilateral 
retaliation adds credence to the Goldsmith/Posner paradigm, but 
concern about long-term multilateral or systemic reciprocity suggests 
something else entirely.  When career lawyers warn that third States 
will cite U.S. actions that dismiss or minimize international law as 
precedent in their relations with their neighboring countries (e.g., Russia 
and Georgia), they are expressing concern about increasing international 
instability through the weakening of the rule of law at large. 
While concern by government officials about criminal prosecution 
or civil suit under domestic statutes (that also happen to incorporate 
international law) may not constitute evidence disproving Goldsmith 
and Posner’s claims, concern for prosecution in third States or 
international tribunals under the international law concept of universal 
jurisdiction as codified in the Torture Convention and Geneva 
Conventions does suggest an exogeneous influence of international law. 
Moreover, when U.S. courts interpret international law as a limit to 
Executive Power, as the Supreme Court did in Hamdan, we are seeing 
the concrete effects of internalization of international law by a 
disaggregated State.  Furthermore, civil actions and criminal complaints 
cannot be so cavalierly dismissed as “lawfare” when they are brought 
by respected American-based lawyers’ groups and civil rights 
organizations or by allied democratic governments.217 
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Finally, influential players within the Executive and Legislative 
branches stressed the important role of reputational concerns in setting 
detainee policy.  The bipartisan commission that investigated the attacks 
of September 11, 2001 concluded in a report in 2005 that “the U.S. 
policy on treating detainees is undermining the war on terrorism by 
tarnishing America’s reputation as a moral leader.”218  The 2008 Senate 
bipartisan committee report similarly observed: “The impact of those 
abuses has been significant.”219  Citing polls indicating that Abu Ghraib 
and Guantanamo Bay have generated negative perceptions of the United 
States as a country that does not respect or abide by the rule of law by 
the populations and government officials of countries around the globe, 
including our closest democratic allies, the report concluded: “The fact 
that America is seen in a negative light by so many complicates our 
ability to attract allies to our side, strengthens the hand of our enemies, 
and reduces our ability to collect intelligence that can save lives.”220  
Consequently, concern about reputation is a much more important 
factor in determining compliance with international law than Goldsmith 
and Posner have acknowledged, especially in a situation where the 
initial decision to depart from international obligations produced such 
immediate and significant reputational costs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
“Under our theory,” write Goldsmith and Posner in The Limits of 
International Law, “international law does not pull states toward 
compliance contrary to their interests.”221 The qualitative empirical data 
and case study of the treatment of detainees set forth above highlight the 
major flaws in Goldsmith and Posner’s approach, proving their 
theoretical model to be neither accurately descriptive nor predictive. 
In contrast to Goldsmith and Posner’s conjectural musings about 
State behavior in the historic case studies described in their book, this 
Article has provided a look inside the heretofore opaque box of U.S. 
foreign policy decision-making, spanning five Presidents.  For many 
readers, this may be their first introduction to L—an influential office 
which has internalized international law and made its compliance part 
of its bureaucratic identity. 
This Article has divulged for the first time several instances during 
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the past thirty years in which, at L’s urging, U.S. policy-makers decided 
to forego the use of force or other policy preferences in order to comply 
with international law.  It has also disclosed many cases in which, at L’s 
counsel, the methods selected or the justifications employed were 
shaped to comply with international law.  Contrary to Goldsmith and 
Posner’s hypothesis, the Legal Advisers have managed to convince 
decision-makers that international law is real law, and that the 
advantages of complying with it almost always outweigh the short-term 
benefits of breaching it.  As Michael Matheson, who spent thirty years 
in L, observed: “So there really is a spectrum in which perhaps only on 
the extreme end of the spectrum does international law always win the 
day, but even on other parts of the spectrum, international law is a 
definite constraint on policy makers.”222 
The Legal Advisers perceive multilateral reciprocity, reputation as 
a law-abiding State, and desire to maintain order and promote the rule 
of law as components of the compliance pull of international law.  
Goldsmith and Posner’s economics-based rational choice approach 
would therefore be more valuable if they were to define “compliance 
pull” in these terms.  We could then more accurately test whether 
international law has an independent causal impact on State behavior by 
examining cases such as the detainee issue where short-term self-
interests predict one behavior and long-term interests, such as those 
identified by the Legal Advisers, predict another.223 
In the final analysis, the qualitative empirical data has shown that 
international law is real because it plays a real role in shaping the 
conduct of States (even a superpower in times of crisis).  International 
law matters because government lawyers and policy-makers use it and 
are influenced by it.  Rather than ask, “Did the relevant actors feel 
compelled to obey international law?,” a more useful question is, “How 
did international law affect their behavior?”224  In this regard, the 
observations of the Legal Advisers and the qualitative empirical data set 
forth in this Article tell us much about how international law is actually 
used for legitimating political actions, for rallying support, for imposing 
restraints, and for persuading policy-makers to choose a particular 
course to achieve their desired goals. 
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